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We extend the well-known ﬁctitious play (FP) algorithm to compute pure-strategy
Bayesian-Nash equilibria in private-value games of incomplete information with ﬁnite
actions and continuous types (G-FACTs). We prove that, if the frequency distribution of
actions (ﬁctitious play beliefs) converges, then there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium
strategy that is consistent with it. We furthermore develop an algorithm to convert the
converged distribution of actions into an equilibrium strategy for a wide class of games
where utility functions are linear in type. This algorithm can also be used to compute pure
-Nash equilibria when distributions are not fully converged. We then apply our algorithm
to ﬁnd equilibria in an important and previously unsolved game: simultaneous sealed-
bid, second-price auctions where various types of items (e.g., substitutes or complements)
are sold. Finally, we provide an analytical characterisation of equilibria in games with
linear utilities. Speciﬁcally, we show how equilibria can be found by solving a system
of polynomial equations. For a special case of simultaneous auctions, we also solve the
equations conﬁrming the results obtained numerically.
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1. Introduction
We study the problem of ﬁnding a symmetric pure Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in static games (i.e., where decisions are
made simultaneously by all players) of incomplete information with independent private values (where the utility of a player
depends only on the actions performed by others and not on their type), continuous type spaces and ﬁnite action spaces.
Existing analytical results for such games mostly focus on auctions, a special case of incomplete information games. However,
despite extensive research in this area, the developed theory has little to offer in terms of equilibrium derivation beyond the
simplest models such as a single auction selling one or multiple homogeneous items (for an overview of the results, see [1]).
On the computational side, solvers have been designed primarily for games of complete information (e.g., [2–4]), and can be
applied to games of incomplete information with only a small number of actions and types. The main contribution of this
paper is an algorithmic technique for computing Bayesian-Nash equilibria in games of incomplete information. We show
its eﬃcacy in simultaneous auctions, an important game of which only special cases were solved before. On the analytical
side, we provide a novel characterisation of equilibria in a large class of games. This characterisation allows us to derive all
equilibria for small simultaneous auction games conﬁrming computational ﬁndings.
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complete information with continuous types. Fictitious play was initially proposed as an iterative method for computing
equilibria in zero-sum games of complete information. In each iteration, the algorithm chooses a best response to the fre-
quency distribution of actions from previous iterations. If this frequency distribution, known as FP beliefs, converges, the
converged distribution yields a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game (see, e.g., [7]). Building on this, we develop an
algorithm that generalises ﬁctitious play to a wide class of games of incomplete information. Unlike regular ﬁctitious play,
if our algorithm converges, a pure-strategy equilibrium is produced.
Following much of the game-theoretic literature (see, e.g., [1,8]), we focus on symmetric games (where all players have
the same type-dependent utility function, action space, type space, and type distribution) with single-dimensional types.1
Our goal is to ﬁnd a pure symmetric equilibrium, which is known to exist in this class of games under very mild assump-
tions (see Section 3 for details). The class of games we consider includes a wide range of commonly studied static games of
incomplete information. Examples include single-sided auctions, double auctions, Cournot/Bertrand duopoly with asymmet-
ric information and negotiation with incomplete information. Whereas we assume a continuous type space, our algorithm
requires the space of actions to be ﬁnite. In fact, in many cases, such as auctions with discrete bids (consider the auctioneer
stepping up the price in an English auction), ﬁnite action spaces are inherent to the problem, yet more diﬃcult to analyse
theoretically. Furthermore, the combination of ﬁnite actions and continuous type distributions guarantees (see Section 3)
existence of a pure equilibrium, and also simpliﬁes the representation of distributions over actions, i.e. FP beliefs.
While the steps of the ﬁctitious play algorithm are the same in games of complete and incomplete information, novel
challenges, such as recovering a pure equilibrium strategy from the converged beliefs, and computing a best-response action
distribution, arise in the latter class of games. Unlike games of complete information, the converged frequency distribution
in incomplete information games does not correspond to a single mixed strategy.2 Moreover, it is not very useful to study
mixed equilibria (as opposed to pure ones) for the types of games we consider. This is because, in games of incomplete
information with continuous types, if a mixed equilibrium exists and under mild conditions on the type distributions, there
always exists a corresponding pure-strategy equilibrium (resulting in the same action distribution), the latter being a more
practical and desirable solution concept.3
To this end, we start by proving that, for converged FP beliefs, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium generating that
distribution. This theoretical result applies to converged beliefs which may only be observed asymptotically. In practice,
we can only run a ﬁnite number of iterations of a FP procedure, never reaching an exact convergence. Therefore, we need
a way to compute equilibria from FP beliefs that have not completely converged. In this case, we turn to approximate
equilibria: after each iteration of our algorithm, we check whether we can produce an -equilibrium strategy from current
beliefs. For this, we need an algorithm that converts FP beliefs into a strategy, such that the action distribution result-
ing from this strategy is the same as the beliefs. We design such an algorithm, which we call BeliefsToStrategy,
for games where the agent’s utility is linear in single-dimensional type (see Section 3 for formal deﬁnitions). Linearity in
type is a standard assumption in most commonly studied single-parameter games including all forms of single-item auc-
tions where an agent’s type denotes the value for receiving the item (Appendix A discusses how our technique can be
applied to domains with multi-dimensional types such as multi-unit or combinatorial auctions). When applied to converged
beliefs, BeliefsToStrategy produces a pure-strategy equilibrium. Furthermore, if a sequence of beliefs is converging,
BeliefsToStrategy yields an -equilibrium for any  after a ﬁnite number of iterations.
We illustrate the power of our approach by ﬁnding equilibria in an important and previously unsolved problem: si-
multaneous sealed-bid auctions. In particular, we study a complete spectrum of combinatorial preferences, from perfect
substitutes to perfect complements. We choose simultaneous auctions as it is a well-known fundamental model that has
received attention in the literature before. However, previously both analytical and numerical results were obtained only for
special cases [10,11].
Finally, in order to benchmark our numerical results, we provide an analytical characterisation of the equilibrium for
games with linear utility functions in terms of a system of polynomial equations. Using this characterisation, we show
how, for the simultaneous auctions setting with two players, two bids, and two auctions, the system can be solved analyt-
ically, providing exact equilibrium and uniqueness results. We then show that this derived equilibrium matches the results
obtained numerically.
Against this background, our contributions to the state-of-the-art are as follows.
• We extend ﬁctitious play to games of incomplete information with ﬁnite actions and single-dimensional continuous
types. We prove that, whenever ﬁctitious play beliefs converge, there exists a pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
consistent with the converged beliefs.
1 In Appendix A.1 we relax the symmetry assumption. The assumption of single-dimensional types is further discussed in Appendix A.2.
2 This is because, in the case of incomplete information, a strategy is a mapping from type to actions, and there is a continuum of mappings that result
in the same distribution of actions.
3 Pure equilibrium is a preferred solution concept as it is conceptually simpler and it does not rely on the ability of a player to randomise (see, e.g.,
discussion on mixed equilibria implementation in [9]).
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functions. We also show that, using this algorithm, if beliefs converge asymptotically, we can obtain an -equilibrium
for any  > 0 within ﬁnite time.
• We ﬁnd equilibria in a prominent, yet previously unsolved, auction game — simultaneous auctions for items ranging
from perfect substitutes to perfect complements.
• We show that an equilibrium in a wide class of games with ﬁnite actions and continuous types can be found by
solving a system of polynomial equations. Using this characterisation, we derive an equilibrium for a special case of
simultaneous auctions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with a review of related work in Section 2. Our model of
games of incomplete information is formally stated in Section 3. A generalised ﬁctitious play algorithm for these games is
presented in Section 4. In Section 5 we provide a best-response algorithm and a procedure for converting FP beliefs to a
strategy for games with utility functions linear in type. Section 6 applies our approach to a simultaneous auctions model.
Finally, an analytical characterisation along with an exact derivation for the special case of two auctions, two players, and
two bid levels appears in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2. Related work
This section provides an overview of ﬁctitious play literature as well as other methods for ﬁnding Nash equilibria. The key
distinction between ours and extant work is that our technique applies to games of incomplete information with continuous
types. Note that games of incomplete information with discrete types can be viewed as games of complete information with
a separate player for each possible type (see, e.g., Deﬁnition 26.1 in [12]). However, this representation is exponential in the
number of types, making techniques for complete information games applicable to only very small game instances. A few
techniques, which we review below, have been developed speciﬁcally for incomplete information games with discrete types.
However, they also become intractable as the number of types increases.
In more detail, ﬁctitious play was initially proposed as an iterative method for computing equilibria in static zero-sum
games of complete information. It was subsequently shown to converge in several restricted classes of games, such as
potential games [13] and bi-matrix 2 × N games [14]. For instance, the work of Monderer and Shapley [15] shows FP
convergence in a restricted class of complete information games (speciﬁcally, games that are response equivalent to identical
payoff games). A related method is no-regret learning (or regret matching) where a player compares actions based on their
average performance in the past (see, e.g., [16,17]). This method has been shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium in the
same restricted class of games where FP converges (see, e.g., [18]). However, in general, the frequency distribution of actions
produced by this method converges to the set of correlated equilibria, which is a weaker solution concept than Nash.
The literature mentioned above applies to settings with complete information. This setting is well studied, and a number
of other general-purpose solvers exist for computing Nash and correlated equilibria [2–4,19–21]). In contrast, there are
many fewer solution algorithms for incomplete information games, though some (e.g. [22–24]) can handle (or be adapted
to) incomplete information games with discrete ﬁnite type sets at the expense of computational feasibility. Notice, however,
that they are still inapplicable to the setting of our paper, since we focus on games with continuous types.
To address the issue of scalability, compact representations such as tree games [25] (where the utility structure induces
a set of dependencies between players that form a tree), Bayesian Action-Graph Games (BAGGs) [26], and Multi-Agent
Inﬂuence Diagrams (MAIDs) [27] have been developed to exploit the game structure: e.g., independence of type distributions
and symmetry. An additional feature of the latter two approaches is their ability to make the game structure available to
general-purpose solution algorithms. In particular, Jiang et al. [26] show how two different algorithms, the global Newton
method [28] and the simplicial subdivision method [29], can be used with BAGGs, and demonstrate experimentally that
these algorithms can result in exponential speedup. However, both BAGGs and MAIDs rely on the fact that the type spaces
of the game they encode are discrete and ﬁnite.
Furthermore, unlike the case of BAGGs and MAIDs, most representations and solution algorithms impose strong restric-
tions on each other, which consequently limits the class of games they can be eﬃciently (if at all) applied to. For example,
Koller et al. [24] had to convert an extensive form game into a sequence form4 in order to supply a payoff matrix to the un-
derlying Lemke’s algorithm. While linear in the size of the extensive form’s tree, the number of action sequences in Koller’s
conversion can be exponential in the number of information sets of the game, which signiﬁcantly impacts the scalability
of the overall algorithm. In normal form games with inﬁnite strategy spaces, Stein et al. [30] had to either limit the scope
to just two players or approximate the solution by discretising the strategy space. Reeves and Wellman [31] restrict atten-
tion to games with two players and piecewise-uniform type distribution and apply an iterated best response to search for
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Another related area of research has resulted from the international poker competition [32], which has inspired a num-
ber of generally applicable algorithms for solving games of incomplete information. For instance, the counterfactual regret
4 Sequence form is a game description similar to normal form, where action sequences replace pure strategies. For typed games it assumes discrete and
ﬁnite type space, hence is inapplicable to our domain.
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by Ganzfried and Sandholm [34]. Furthermore, Hawkin et al. [35] focus on transforming a game with a continuum of actions
into a smaller game, and develop a new regret-minimisation algorithm to solve this game which builds on the counterfac-
tual regret algorithm from [33]. These papers differ from our approach in that they view poker as a game with a ﬁnite
discrete type space, and their algorithms rely on this property. Another approach is by Ganzfried and Sandholm [36], who
formulate the problem as a mixed integer linear feasibility program. Their algorithm requires the set of types to be ﬁnite
(and the number of constraints increases linearly with the number of types), but the authors then discuss how the approach
can be extended to deal with continuous types. However, this extension requires the type distributions to be piecewise lin-
ear, and additional constraints are needed for each segment. By contrast, our algorithm is speciﬁcally designed for settings
with continuous type spaces, and does not rely on assumptions about the shape of the distribution. Furthermore, differ-
ent from our approach, their obtained equilibrium is a mixed one (whereas our algorithm always produces a pure-strategy
equilibrium). In addition, their approach relies on having a qualitative model of the domain, which means that the number
of intervals that divide the type space, as well as the actions associated with each of these intervals, are known. In contrast,
our algorithm assumes no such knowledge.
Closer to the settings considered in this work, Gerding et al. [11] applied a variant of ﬁctitious play called smoothed
ﬁctitious play to ﬁnd mixed strategy equilibria in simultaneous auctions selling perfect substitutes when the number of
bidder types is small. By contrast, here we consider continuous types and show that FP can be used to ﬁnd pure equilibria.
The FP algorithm for ﬁnding pure equilibria in games with incomplete information was ﬁrst introduced in our previous work
where the algorithm was applied to simultaneous auctions with perfect substitutes [37]. The current paper builds on [37]
and signiﬁcantly extends that paper. In particular, we introduce, for the ﬁrst time, the BeliefsToStrategy algorithm to
recover the pure strategy from the beliefs; we formally prove several properties of this algorithm; we extend the analysis of
single-sided simultaneous auctions to a range of combinatorial preferences, from perfect substitutes to perfect complements;
ﬁnally, we provide an analytical characterisation of the equilibrium strategy for small settings.
Our work also contributes to the literature on analytical derivations of equilibrium bidding strategies in the domain of
simultaneous single-sided auctions, and auctions with discrete bids. Simultaneous Vickrey auctions selling complementary
goods are studied in [10]. There, a distinction is made between local bidders, who only participate in one given auction, and
global bidders who can participate in all auctions. The equilibrium and resultant market eﬃciency are derived for a model
where each auction contains both global and local bidders. The model studied in [10] is further extended to the case of
common values in [38]. The model we consider is more general in that it also applies to games other than auctions, and we
obtain solutions for a variety of preferences, from perfect complements to perfect substitutes. The case with substitutable
goods is studied by [39] in a setting restricted to three sellers and two global bidders and with each bidder having the
same value (and thereby knowing the value of other bidders). The space of symmetric mixed equilibrium strategies is
derived for this special case. Another setting where bidders face multiple simultaneous sealed-bid auctions is studied in
e.g. [40–42]. These papers assume that bidders bid in only a single auction and choose this auction with some probability
(where this probability depends on the reserve prices of the auctions). In [43], however, it was shown that choosing a single
auction is not optimal. Speciﬁcally, if all other bidders choose only one auction, and when their types are sampled from
distributions with non-decreasing hazard rates (which includes a wide range of common distribution functions including
uniform, normal and exponential), the best response is always to place non-zero bids in all auctions. Our paper differs
from [43] since we consider equilibrium behaviour, whereas the analysis in [43] is decision theoretic. Moreover, the analysis
is limited to perfect substitutes and empirical evaluation, and relies on discretising the type space. In [44] the authors
attempt to ﬁnd the equilibrium strategies for this setting using iterative best response, but they show that, in fact, the
strategies never converge.
Finally, a number of researchers have investigated auctions with discrete bid levels. A ﬁrst-price auction for a single item
is considered in [45]. There, equilibrium is characterised, and revenues are compared for different increments, deﬁning sets
of evenly spaced discrete bids. Discrete bids that are not necessarily uniformly spaced are studied in [46] in the context of a
second-price auction for a single item. A special case of our characterisation of the best response for linear utilities appears
there for a single action/item case. Our analytical characterisation goes beyond the case of single-item auctions, allowing
derivation of equilibria in previously unsolved problems such as simultaneous auctions (see Section 7).
3. Games with ﬁnite actions and continuous types
We consider symmetric games of incomplete information with a ﬁnite number of actions and players with single-
dimensional types, where types are sampled from a continuous type space. A game consists of n players, and the set of
players is denoted by N . Each player draws his type θ ∈ Θ ⊂ R independently from a commonly known continuous dis-
tribution over Θ with density f , and a corresponding cumulative distribution F . Without loss of generality, we take the
type space to be Θ = [0,1]. The same ﬁnite set of actions A = {a1, . . . ,am} is available to each player. We adopt a standard
independent private value model where the utility of a player is independent of the types of other players, and of the
identity of the player performing an action (only the action matters, not who executed it). Therefore, the utility of a player
is a function that depends on his type, his action, and the actions of the other players, u : Θ × An → R. For our theoret-
ical results, we furthermore require that the utility is continuous in θ . The tuple Γ = 〈N, A,u(·),Θ, F (·)〉 then deﬁnes a
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Our algorithm works in the context of G-FACTs as described here, but note that some of these assumptions can be relaxed.
In particular, we discuss extensions to asymmetric games and multi-dimensional types in Appendix A. The assumptions of
independent private values and ﬁnite actions are inherent to the algorithm.
As is common in literature on Bayesian games, we study symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibria: i.e., equilibria where all
players follow the same strategy (see, e.g., Chapters 2, 3, 6, 7 in [1]). A pure strategy s : Θ → A is a function that speciﬁes
an action for each player type. We denote by S the set of all strategies s : Θ → A. Letting X = (X1, . . . , Xn−1) ∈ Θn−1 denote
the random variables representing the types of the other n − 1 players, the expected utility of a player of type θ playing
action ai when all other players follow the strategy s is E{X j∼F }n−1j=1 [u(θ,ai, (s(X1), . . . , s(Xn−1)))].
Instead of expressing the expected utility in terms of the strategies of other players, it is more convenient to use an
equivalent representation in terms of the distribution of actions of the other players. The latter representation allows us to
take advantage of the ﬁniteness of the action space enabling an eﬃcient best response calculation. The action distribution
resulting from a strategy is derived as follows. Let s−1(ai) ⊆ Θ denote the set of all types playing action ai . The probability
that an agent’s type is from this set is hs(ai) =
∫
s−1(ai) f (x)dx, and hs ∈ (A) is the distribution of actions resulting from an
agent playing s. When all other agents follow the same strategy s, the expected utility of an agent of type θ playing action
ai can be written as:
uˆ(θ,ai,hs) = E{Y j∼hs}n−1j=1
[
u
(
θ,ai, (Y1, . . . , Yn−1)
)]
. (1)
The expected utility from playing a strategy s′(·) when everyone else plays a strategy s(·) is u˜(s′,hs) = Eθ [uˆ(θ, s′(θ),hs)].
Example 1. To illustrate the notation, and to give an example of a game from the G-FACT class, consider a simple, single-
item ﬁrst-price auction with n bidders, each bidder’s value uniformly distributed in Θ = [0,1] (F = U (0,1)), and 4 discrete
bids from 0 to 3 dollars (A = {0,1,2,3}). Furthermore, the strategy is given by:
s(θ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
a1 = 0 if 0 θ < 0.2,
a2 = 1 if 0.2 θ < 0.3,
a3 = 2 if 0.3 θ < 0.65,
a4 = 3 if 0.65 θ  1.
Given that θ is uniformly distributed, the action distributions are as follows: hs(a1) = 0.2, hs(a2) = 0.1, hs(a3) = 0.35, and
hs(a4) = 0.35. Suppose that a player with type θ derives a utility of (3θ − ai) if she wins the item, and 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, considering a fair tie breaking rule, the probability of winning when the agent ties with j other agents is 1j+1 .
Note that a player wins the auction if either all other bids are lower (and thus, j = 0), or if n− j− 1 bids are lower and the
remaining j (excluding his own) bids are equal and she wins the tie. Furthermore, there are
(n−1
j
)
ways to choose j bidders
to tie with. Each such tie occurs with probability (hs(ai)) j(
∑
ak<ai
hs(ak))n− j−1, where the ﬁrst term ensures that there are
j bids equal to the agent’s bid, and the second term ensures that all other bids are lower. Then the expected utility of a
player with type θ when playing action ai , given n− 1 other bidders is:
uˆ(θ,ai,hs) = (3θ − ai)
n−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
j
)
1
j + 1
(
hs(ai)
) j( ∑
ak<ai
hs(ak)
)n− j−1
. (2)
For example, the probability of winning the auction when placing action a1 is equal to 1nhs(a1)
n−1. Note that, due to the tie
breaking rule, we need to sum over all possible values of 1 j  n, and multiply this by the number of possible occurrences
using the binomial coeﬃcient. This calculation becomes more onerous when we consider multiple simultaneous auctions in
Section 6.
Now, as mentioned earlier, we are interested in ﬁnding equilibrium strategies. We deﬁne the necessary terms in the
following.
Deﬁnition 1. A strategy s : Θ → A is a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of a game Γ if:
u˜(s,hs) u˜
(
s′,hs
) ∀s′ ∈ S.
Some of our results do not produce an exact equilibrium. In those cases, we use an approximate equilibrium deﬁned
below.
5 Our notation for agents’ utility and type exploits the fact that the game is symmetric: i.e., each agent has the same type and action spaces and the
utility of each agent is independent of his identity. Speciﬁcally, each agent’s utility is given by the same function u, which is not indexed by i.
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u˜(s,hs)+   u˜
(
s′,hs
) ∀s′ ∈ S.
It will sometimes be convenient to state this deﬁnition in terms of deviations in actions for each type rather than
deviations in strategies. Deﬁnition 1 can be re-stated using deviations in actions (see Deﬁnition 8.E.1 and Proposition 8.E.1
in [8]).
Deﬁnition 3. A strategy s : Θ → A is a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of a game Γ if for almost6 every θ ∈ Θ
(w.r.t. F ):
uˆ
(
θ, s(θ),hs
)
 uˆ(θ,ai,hs) ∀ai ∈ A.
We note that limiting our analysis to symmetric pure-strategy equilibria does not impact the space of games we can
solve.
Proposition 1. (From [49,50].) Every G-FACT has a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. G-FACTs belong to a larger class of games where a pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium is known to exist, if two
conditions hold [49,50]: (a) the distribution of types is continuous; (b) uˆ(θ, s(θ),hs) is continuous in type θ and in distri-
bution of actions hs . The ﬁrst condition holds for G-FACT by deﬁnition. The second also follows from the assumption that
the utilities u(θ,a1, . . . ,an) are continuous in θ , and in addition from the fact that uˆ is an expectation of such functions
and the corresponding space of events (i.e. the probability that certain combinations of actions are played) is ﬁnite. In more
detail, uˆ is a (ﬁnite) linear combination of continuous functions u(θ, . . .), therefore uˆ is itself continuous in θ . Furthermore,
because hs dictates the coeﬃcients of the linear combination that deﬁnes uˆ, uˆ is also continuous in hs . As a result, a G-FACT
can always be solved in terms of a pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium.
In addition, any mixed equilibrium in such games can be converted into a pure-strategy equilibrium using a puriﬁcation
procedure [50]. Intuitively, since a strategy is a mapping from types to actions, such a puriﬁcation involves ﬁnding a pure-
strategy mapping which results in the same action distribution as the original mixed strategy. 
4. Fictitious play for G-FACTs
In this section we extend ﬁctitious play, which ﬁnds mixed equilibria in some complete information games, to search
for pure strategy equilibria in G-FACTs. Before doing so, we consider the basic FP algorithm as it is applies to normal form
games with complete information.
In detail, at each iteration t , the FP algorithm consists of the following two steps:
• Compute best response: given the belief that the mixed strategy of the opponent is s′t , calculate a best response st .• Update beliefs: merge s′t and st into a new mixed strategy s′t+1.
These steps are then repeated until some convergence criterion is satisﬁed. A standard way to perform the merge in
the second step is by averaging all best responses observed thus far. As a result, the inﬂuence of any subsequent best-
response strategy diminishes with time. However, other approaches are suggested, e.g. using a weighted average, where
higher weights are assigned to more recent strategies, or using a sliding window average, where only a small list of recent
best responses is kept (see [51] for a discussion on these variations).
The algorithm in Fig. 1 generalises the two steps described above to symmetric games of incomplete information with
ﬁnite actions and continuous types. An input to the algorithm is initial beliefs, h0, about the action distribution. At each
iteration t , the best-response strategy is computed (line 3) with respect to the beliefs about the action distribution of
an opponent, ht (since we search for symmetric equilibria, each opponent draws his action from the same distribution).
The algorithm for computing a best-response strategy is referred to as BestResponse, and the details of the algorithm
depend on the speciﬁc domain (since the types are continuous and we cannot simply enumerate all possible strategies as
with discrete type spaces). In Section 5.1 (see Fig. 4) we provide an instantiation of the algorithm for eﬃciently computing
the best response for the setting with linear utility functions. Formally, s is a best-response strategy (or simply a “best
response") to an action distribution h if:
s(θ) ∈ argmax
ai∈A
uˆ(θ,ai,h) ∀θ. (3)
6 “Almost” in this context means that the probability of all types for which the strategy s does not prescribe an optimal action is zero [47,48].
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Input: game Γ = 〈N, A,u(·),Θ, F (·)〉, initial beliefs h0, update rule κ
Output: if converges, equilibrium strategy
1: set iteration count t = 0
2: repeat
3: strategy s = BestResponse(Γ,ht )
4: compute the corresponding action distribution:
∀ai ∈ A: hs(ai) =
∫
s−1(ai ) f (x)dx
5: update beliefs:
∀ai ∈ A: ht+1(ai) = κ(t)ht (ai)+ (1− κ(t))hs(ai)
6: set t = t + 1
7: until converged
8: return BeliefsToStrategy(ht+1)
Fig. 1. Fictitious play algorithm for symmetric games of incomplete information.
Once the best response, s, is obtained, its corresponding action distribution, hs , is calculated (line 4), and the beliefs of
the next iteration, ht+1, are generated using an update rule (e.g., a standard update rule, κ(t) = tt+1 ). If beliefs converge
(line 7), a pure-strategy equilibrium can be obtained from these beliefs (line 8) as we prove in Theorem 1. We provide an
algorithm termed BeliefsToStrategy for recovering an equilibrium strategy for the case of linear utilities in Fig. 5.
Convergence in ﬁctitious play occurs if ht → h∗ as t → ∞. This asymptotic convergence is called convergence in beliefs
(see, e.g., [7]). In games of complete information, h∗ is both the frequency distribution of actions and an equilibrium mixed
strategy. In the incomplete information games studied here, h∗ is just the frequency distribution of actions, and does not
explicitly correspond to an equilibrium strategy (we demonstrate this in Section 6.2.3). Nevertheless, a pure-strategy equi-
librium can be recovered from the converged beliefs h∗ by taking the best response to it as stated below.
Theorem 1. If ﬁctitious play beliefs converge ht → h∗ as t → ∞, then there is a strategy s∗ that is a best response to the converged
beliefs h∗ and that induces h∗ as its action distribution hs∗ = h∗; i.e., s∗ is an equilibrium strategy.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we ﬁrst consider the mapping from an action distribution, h, to the set of action distributions
produced by all best-response functions to h. This step is also used in Theorem 2 of [49] to prove existence of an equilibrium
distribution of actions, i.e. hs∗ . We then proceed by assuming the converse: h∗ is not a member of distributions produced
by best-response strategies to h∗ . We show that it contradicts convergence of ht to h∗ . Details of the proof follow.
Given that the action space A = {a1, . . . ,am} is ﬁnite, all distributions over A form a simplex (A). Denote for 1 i m,
ei ∈ (A) ⊂ Rm a vector with ith element set to one, eii = 1, and all others to zero, e ji = 0,∀i = j. Let E = {ei}mi=1. Then
for any type θ , and a distribution of opponent actions h, the set of (pure) best responses can be described in terms of the
following correspondence:
Φ(θ,h) = {ei ∈ E ∣∣ u(θ,ai,h) u(θ,a j,h) ∀a j ∈ A}.
Φ is non-empty and closed-valued, and upper hemicontinuous. By integrating over θ we can obtain the set of all action
distributions produced by best responses to h. Let Ψ (h) = ∫ Φ(θ,h) f (θ)dθ , i.e. the set of action distributions generated by
different best-response strategies, where:∫
Φ(θ,h) f (θ)dθ =
{∫
φ(θ,h) f (θ)dθ
∣∣ φ : Θ ×(A) → E, φ(θ,h) ∈ Φ(θ,h)
}
.
Since f is continuous, Ψ is non-empty, compact and convex-valued, and upper hemicontinuous.7
Now, assume that h∗ /∈ Ψ (h∗), in other words no best-response strategy to h∗ has the action distribution h∗ . In this case,
since Ψ is compact and convex-valued, h∗ can be separated from Ψ (h∗). Intuitively, it means that the distance from h∗ to
any distribution generated by a best response to h∗ , although small, is not negligible. More formally, there exist two open
neighbourhoods, U1 of h∗ and U2 of Ψ (h∗), so that the following holds:
h∗ ∈ U1, Ψ
(
h∗
)⊂ U2, U1 ∩ U2 = ∅.
Furthermore, these neighbourhoods can be chosen so that there exists  > 0 such that U1 is an open ball of radius  ,
U1 = B(h∗), and the distance between U1 and U2, d(U1,U2), is at least  . In addition, since Ψ is upper hemicontinuous,
we can reduce  to guarantee that ∀h ∈ U1, Ψ (h) ⊂ U2. In other words, best responses to distributions close to h∗ have
action distributions that are very close to those generated by best responses to h∗ itself.
7 Relevant theorems, their origin and application to equilibria analysis can be found in the book by Hildenbrand [48]. Speciﬁcally, see Theorem 4 on p. 64
and Proposition 7 on p. 73.
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and 0< λ< 1 it holds that d(h,U2) > d((1− λ)h + λh′,U2)+ cλ.
Now, let T be such that d(hT ,h∗) < ; i.e., hT ∈ B(h∗). During an FP update, s(hT ) is a best response to hT , and
hT+1 = TT+1hT + 1T+1hs , where hs(ai) =
∫
1(s(θ) = ai) f (θ)dθ . By deﬁnition hs ∈ Ψ (hT ) and Ψ (hT ) ⊂ U2, thus hs ∈ U2. As
argued above d(hT+1,U2) + c 1T+1 < d(hT ,U2). Since
∑
t
1
t = ∞ and in each FP iteration the distance between hT and U2
decreases by c 1T+1 , there exists t > T so that h
t /∈ B(h∗). This contradicts convergence of ht to h∗ . Therefore, h∗ ∈ Ψ (h∗).
Since h∗ ∈ Ψ (h∗), there exists a selection function s∗ : Θ → A, so that almost everywhere u(θ, s∗(θ),h∗) > u(θ,a j,h∗)
∀a j ∈ A, and h∗(ai) = hs∗ (ai) =
∫
1(s(θ) = ai) f (θ)dθ . In other words s∗ is the best-response strategy to the action distribu-
tion it produces, and hence an equilibrium. 
Corollary 1. If the best response s∗ to h∗ is unique, then it is an equilibrium strategy.
Equilibrium properties of ﬁctitious play apply only to asymptotically converged beliefs. In numerical simulations, we are
limited to a ﬁnite number of iterations and have to deal with approximate convergence. Consider a natural measure to
establish convergence, which occurs once the (Euclidean) distance between ht and ht+1 falls below some convergence error.
This, however, is not a reliable convergence measure, as there is no guarantee that the distance in beliefs does not exceed
the convergence error in later iterations.
To avoid the problem with identifying convergence in beliefs in a ﬁnite number of iterations, we can instead check at
each iteration if an -equilibrium has been reached.8 This is done by constructing a strategy from the beliefs and checking
if that strategy is an -equilibrium strategy. We provide a procedure for converting beliefs to strategy in the next section
for the case of linear utilities.
5. Applying FP to G-FACTs with linear utilities
In this section we instantiate the BestResponse and BeliefsToStrategy algorithms for a particular setting where
a player’s expected utility, uˆ(θ, s(θ),hs), is linear in his type, θ . Note that our FictitiousPlay algorithm from Fig. 1 does
not rely on linearity, and other procedures can be developed for non-linear settings. However, linearity is actually common
in many games: in particular, it is inherent in all single-parameter models where the type of an agent denotes the value an
agent receives in a “winning set of outcomes” (e.g., when the agent wins the item in an auction or when a public project
is undertaken).9 This can be seen in Example 1 from Section 3 (see Eq. (2)), where the expected utility is linear in θ . This
includes not only all one-shot single-item auctions (e.g., ﬁrst-price, second-price, all-pay, see [1]), but also the simultaneous
auctions studied in Section 6.
In the following, we start by making a few observations about the structure of a best response when utilities are linear
and provide an algorithm for ﬁnding it. We then use these results to construct an algorithm for converting converged
beliefs to a pure-strategy equilibrium. Together with a convergence metric described below, these algorithms instantiate our
FictitiousPlay algorithm for games with linear utilities.
5.1. Best response
When (expected) utilities are linear in θ for a given ai and h, we refer to the expected utility functions uˆ(·,ai,h) as
utility lines, and these functions are of the form:
uˆ(θ,ai,hs) = θ · slope(ai,hs)+ intercept(ai,hs), (4)
where the slope and y-intercept are constant for a given action ai and action distribution hs . In the following, let L =
{uˆ(θ,ai,hs)}ai∈A denote the set of all utility lines. Each utility line can be represented by its slope and intercept, and so we
will sometimes use L = {σi, ιi}i∈{1,...,m} , where σi and ιi are the slope and intercept associated with action ai .
Now, in general, we can see that the best response corresponds to the actions associated with the upper envelope of
the utility functions in L. Formally, an upper envelope is given by u∗(θ) = maxai∈A uˆ(θ,ai,h). In the case of linear utility
functions, this upper envelope consists of a piecewise linear function, where each line segment corresponds to a particular
utility line (and each utility line corresponds to a particular action). Furthermore, the upper envelope is always convex (to
see this, note that, for any two crossing lines, their upper envelope is convex).
Observation 1. In the case of linear utility functions, the upper envelope is piecewise linear and convex.
8 We discuss the appropriateness of this measure of convergence in Section 6.2.2.
9 Note that, since the expected utility (see Eq. (1)) is a linear combination of the individual utilities u(θ,a), the expected utility uˆ(θ, s(θ),hs) is linear in
θ if the individual utilities are linear. Therefore, when we say that utilities are linear, this also means that the expected utility is linear.
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Algorithm UtilityLines
Input: game Γ = 〈N, A,u(·),Θ, F (·)〉, distribution of actions h
Output: utility lines L = {σi , ιi}i∈{1,...,m}
1: for i = 1 to m
2: Given game Γ , calculate the slope and intercept:
σi = slope(ai ,h)
ιi = inter(ai ,h)
3: return {σi , ιi}i∈{1,...,m}
Fig. 3. Generating utility lines for a game Γ given a distribution of actions h, where a utility line is deﬁned by its slope and intercept.
An example of a best response is shown in Fig. 2. More formally, the upper envelope can be represented as a partition of
the type space [0,1] into intervals, each labelled with its utility line and corresponding action. Let c ∈ [0,1]m′−1 | 0 < c1 <
c2 < · · · < cm′−1 < 1 denote a partition into m′ intervals [0, c1], [c1, c2], [c2, c3], . . . , [cm′−1,1] and let A′ denote the set of
actions {a′1, . . . ,a′m′ } ⊆ A, where a′j ∈ A is the best-response action on the interval [c j−1, c j]. Note that each action a′j ∈ A′
maps to an action ai ∈ A, but the indexing is different. Similarly, let L′ = {uˆ(θ,a′i,hs)}a′i∈A′ = {σ ′i , ι′i}i∈{1,...,m′} ⊆ L denote the
corresponding utility lines. Due to Observation 1, note that σ ′i  σ ′j whenever i > j. In Fig. 2, the upper envelope is given by
the triple (L′, A′, c) where A′ = {a′1,a′2,a′3} = {a1,a3,a4} and c = (c1, c2). Then, the pair (A′, c) describes the corresponding
best response.
We are now ready to introduce the algorithms needed to compute the best response. The ﬁrst step is to compute the
utility lines, which depends on the rules of the game Γ = 〈N, A,u(·),Θ, F (·)〉. We assume an algorithm for doing this is
available (see Fig. 3), but cannot provide a speciﬁc algorithm since this depends on the details of the problem domain.
We will, however, instantiate the algorithm for the simultaneous auctions setting in Section 6 (in which case the expected
utility is given by Eq. (5)).
Given an algorithm for computing the utility lines, Fig. 4 presents an algorithm for computing the best response, which
proceeds as follows. First, we generate a utility line for each action a ∈ A. Then, all lines are sorted according to their
slope (line 2). For ease of exposition, we slightly abuse notation and refer to σ1 as the lowest slope, followed by σ2, etc.
Similarly, the action with the lowest corresponding slope is referred to as a1 followed by a2, etc. The best response at θ = 0
is selected in line 3. Note that this simply requires ﬁnding the utility line with the highest intercept (since uˆ(0,ai,h) = ιi).
This utility line forms the initial upper envelope (L′, A′, c). Now, due to the convexity of the upper envelope (Observation 1),
line segments at θ > 0 need to have slopes of at least σi , which means that we can disregard any utility lines j < i. Hence,
the for loop at line 5 starts with j = i + 1. In each iteration of the main loop (line 5), we consider whether to include the
jth utility line in the current envelope (L′, A′, c) possibly replacing one or more previously added lines. Now, since the lines
are considered in the order of their slope, there are only two possible cases: it can either lie entirely below the current
envelope, in which case it has no effect on the upper envelope and can be disregarded; or, it intersects the envelope at a
unique point x ∈ (0,1). Note that it cannot lie entirely above the envelope, since it has to be below the envelope at point
θ = 0 (otherwise, this would mean that ι j > ιi which contradicts the maximisation in line 3) and that it cannot cross the
envelope (L′, A′, c) at more than one point (its slope is higher than the slopes of L′ , and, therefore, once it crosses (L′, A′, c),
it increases faster than any of the lines L′ and does not cross them).
Whenever the jth utility line crosses the current envelope, this envelope is updated as follows. First of all, due to
Observation 1, and since we know that σ j is higher than any existing slope in L′ , the line segment necessarily needs to
appear at the end of the envelope. Therefore, since the intersection point is x, we can remove any utility lines in the current
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Input: game Γ = 〈N, A,u(·),Θ, F (·)〉
distribution of actions h
Output: best response s : Θ → A represented by (A′, c)
1: generate utility lines L = {σi , ιi}i∈{1,...,m} = UtilityLines(Γ,h)
2: sort the utility lines in increasing order of slope
let ai denote the action with the ith lowest slope: σ1  σ2  · · ·
3: ﬁnd the index of the utility line that maximises utility at θ = 0:
i = argmax j∈{1,...,m} uˆ(0,a j ,hs) = argmax j∈{1,...,m} ι j
4: let σ ′1 = σi , ι′1 = ιi , and a′1 = ai and deﬁne the initial envelope as:
L′ = {σ ′1, ι′1}, A′ = {a′1} and c = ()
5: for j = i + 1 to m
if uˆ(θ,a j ,hs) = θσ j + ι j intersects the envelope (L′, A′, c) at x ∈ Θ
let k ∈ {1, . . . , |A′|} denote the index of the intersected utility line in L′:
i.e., where x ∈ [ck−1, ck], with c0 = 0 and c|A′ | = 1
update the envelope (L′, A′, c) as follows:
5.1: remove all utility lines with index z > k from (L′, A′, c)
5.2: append utility line with index j at position k + 1,
i.e. σ ′k+1 = σ j , ι′k+1 = ι j , a′k+1 = a j , and ck = x
6: return (A′, c)
Fig. 4. An algorithm for computing best response when agents’ utilities are linear in a single-parameter type θ ∈ [0,1].
envelope which appear after x. These are the lines z > k, and they are removed in line 5.1. Then, a new line segment is
added to the envelope which intersects with the kth line at point x, and provides the best response for θ ∈ [x,1] (i.e., the
new utility line is appended at the end). Note that, since the utility lines are considered in the order of their slope, and
new lines are always appended at the end, the resulting upper envelope is convex (as it should be).
Ignoring computation of the utility lines, the runtime of the BestResponse algorithm is dominated by line 5. Note
that, to ﬁnd the intersection point and the corresponding line segment in L′ (if any) requires looping through all lines in L′ ,
which has at most m − 1 values. Moreover, the for loop at line 5 also has at most m − 1 values. Therefore, the worst-case
runtime is in the order O (m2). We note that the upper envelope can be computed in m logm time (see, e.g., [52]). However,
we opt for a simpler implementation since it is eﬃcient in practice (since m′ is typically much smaller than m) and (as
discussed in Section 6.2.2) the total run-time of one iteration of our algorithm is likely to be dominated by the computation
of the individual utility lines.
To apply our method, one needs to be able to compute utility lines. Since there are m actions, the utility lines are
represented by m slopes and intercepts. This is independent of other game parameters such as the number of players.10 The
computation of utility lines is speciﬁc to the particular domain, and this can become a bottleneck. However, in practice, it is
often possible to reduce the computation of a utility line by using a compact representation of a game (such as action-graph
games [26]), but we cannot provide any general analysis. We do provide the details of how to eﬃciently compute utility
lines in the domain we study in Section 6. There, computation is dominated by the domain-speciﬁc tie-breaking rule (see
Appendix B).
5.2. Converting ﬁctitious play beliefs to a pure strategy
Although Theorem 1 shows that an equilibrium strategy can be recovered from the limit of ﬁctitious play beliefs, it does
not provide an exact algorithm for doing so, but rather assumes that such a procedure exists. From a theoretical point of
view this assumption is valid, since the necessary puriﬁcation procedures are guaranteed to exist (see, e.g., [50]). However,
by itself, existence of a procedure is insuﬃcient to apply the algorithm. For this reason, in this section provide an explicit
puriﬁcation algorithm BeliefsToStrategy (see Fig. 5) for G-FACTs with type-linear utilities. In addition, based on the
insight of this procedure, we point out in Appendix A the steps necessary for generalisation of this procedure to non-linear
utility functions.
The BeliefsToStrategy algorithm in Fig. 5 constructs a strategy where action ai is played with probability h(ai).
Actions are sorted in ascending order of slopes of their utility lines and the action with the lowest slope a′1 is played
by the types θ ∈ [0,h(a′1)]. The next action a′2 is played by the types θ ∈ [h(a′1),h(a′1) + h(a′2)], etc. The algorithm has
two important properties. First, for a converged distribution of actions h∗ , BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) is an equilibrium.
Second, if h is suﬃciently close to a converged distribution, BeliefsToStrategy(h) is an -equilibrium strategy. These
properties are the subject of the following two theorems.
Theorem 2. If ﬁctitious play beliefs converge ht → h∗ as t → ∞, then a pure-strategy equilibrium can be constructed using the
algorithm in Fig. 5.
10 This is largely due to symmetry, but even in the asymmetric case (discussed in Appendix A.1), the number of utility lines is n ·m and so scales linearly
in the number of players.
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Input: game Γ = 〈N, A,u(·),Θ, F (·)〉
distribution of actions h
Output: equilibrium strategy (A′, c)
1: gather actions played with positive probability Aˆ = {ai ∈ A | h(ai) > 0}
2: generate utility lines for actions Aˆ
L = {σi , ιi}i∈{1,...,| Aˆ|} = UtilityLines(〈N, Aˆ,u(·),Θ, F (·)〉,h)
3: sort the utility lines in increasing order of slope
let a′i denote the action with the i
th lowest slope: σ1  σ2  · · ·
and deﬁne the ordered set A′ = (a′1, . . . ,a′| Aˆ|)
4: generate the strategy that produces action distribution h
deﬁne c = (c1, . . . , c|A′ |−1) ∈ R |A′ |−1 | c j =∑ ji=1 h(a′i) ∀1 j |A′| − 1
5: return (A′, c)
Fig. 5. An algorithm for converting distribution of actions h into a pure strategy when agents’ utilities are linear in a single-parameter type θ ∈ [0,1].
Proof. As we have shown in Theorem 1, convergence of beliefs means that the distribution h∗ is produced by an equi-
librium strategy: i.e., there exists a best response s∗ to h∗ that generates h∗ itself. We also know that the latter property
holds for BeliefsToStrategy(h∗), since it produces h∗ . Therefore, to conclude that BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) is an
equilibrium, it remains to be shown that BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) is a best response to h∗ . To achieve this, we will
compare the BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) strategy and an arbitrary best response to h∗ , s∗ . We will show that either
BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) completely coincides with s∗ , or has the same utility for all types, and therefore is also a
best response to h∗ .
Now, recall that in the case of linear utility lines, any best response can be expressed using the interval representation
(A′, c). In this representation, the intervals (A′, c) are listed in a non-decreasing order of their respective utility line slopes
(see Observation 1). Furthermore, the length of interval [ci−1, ci] is given by h∗(a′i). But this is exactly the strategy produced
by BeliefsToStrategy(h∗). Hence, if the best response to h∗ is unique, BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) is necessarily this
best-response strategy.
The only discrepancy between BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) and a best response s∗ to h∗ may occur if some set of actions,
A′′ ⊂ A′ , have the same utility line, when evaluated at h∗ . In this situation, it is possible that BeliefsToStrategy(h∗)
and s∗ choose different actions from A′′ for some disagreement types. However, all these disagreement types will belong wlog.
to a single interval K where all actions from A′′ constitute a best response. Since, any action ai ∈ A′′ is a best-response for
types in K , BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) is a best response for all types in K .
Furthermore, actions in A′′ are in a strict order (with respect to the utility line slope) with actions in A′ \ A′′ . Hence,
BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) assigns actions in A′′ for types in K , and only for types in K , and the same is true for any
best response to h∗ . If the remaining structure, i.e. the use of actions in A′ \ A′′ , of the best response s∗ is unique
for the complement of K , K¯ , then this structure coincides with that of BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) over K¯ . As a result,
BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) chooses best-response actions for all types, and is a best-response strategy to h∗ for all types.
If the best-response structure over K¯ using A′ \ A′′ is not unique, we repeat the argument regarding disagreement types for
K¯ using A′ \ A′′ . Since the set of actions is ﬁnite, there may be only a ﬁnite number of such iterations before the remain-
ing best-response structure becomes unique. We conclude, that even if BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) differs from s∗ in its
choices of actions for some types, this does not lead to reduction of utility. Therefore, BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) is a best
response to h∗ .
Finally, since BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) is a best response to h∗ and generates h∗ , it is the equilibrium strategy. 
Theorem 3. Let {ht}∞t=1 be a converging ﬁctitious play sequence, ht → h∗ . Denote by st the best response to ht calculated during
iteration t of ﬁctitious play. Then:∣∣u˜(BeliefsToStrategy(ht),ht)− u˜(st ,ht)∣∣→ 0.
Proof. Notice that, if there are multiple best responses to h∗ , their utility is necessarily the same. Since the utility lines
uˆ(θ,ai,h) are continuous in θ and h, and m is ﬁnite, their upper envelope is a continuous function in θ and h. Recall
also that we have assumed the set of types to be compact and f continuous, hence u˜(s,h) = Eθ∼ f [uˆ(θ, s(θ),h)] is also
uniformly continuous in h for any (not necessarily best-response) strategy s (with a ﬁnite interval representation (A, c)).
As a result, for any strategy s and for any δ > 0 exists T such that for all t > T , |u˜(s,ht) − u˜(s,h∗)| < δ. In particular, we
can choose T so that |u˜(BeliefsToStrategy(ht),ht) − u˜(BeliefsToStrategy(ht),h∗)| < δ. Furthermore, a similar
result holds for u˜(s[h],h), where s[h] is a functional that returns a best-response strategy (e.g., the one from Fig. 4), such
that |u˜(st ,ht) − u˜(s∗,h∗)| < δ. To see this, recall that the utility of the best response is an upper envelope of a ﬁnite set of
functions continuous in h, hence also continuous in h. As a result, u˜(s[h],h) is uniformly continuous as a function of h, and
the necessary inequality follows.
Now, deﬁne the following correspondence:
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Notice that, similarly to Φ and Ψ from Theorem 1, this correspondence is non-empty, closed- and compact-valued and
upper hemicontinuous. We deﬁne the distance between two strategies as d(s1, s2) =
∫
1(s1(θ) = s2(θ)) f (θ)dθ . Then for any
positive δ that is less than the probability of any action that is part of a best response to h′ or h∗ , i.e. holds that:
δ <min
(
min
a′i∈A′
h′
(
a′i
)
, min
a∗i ∈A∗
h∗
(
a∗i
))
,
there exists T such that for all t > T it holds that for any s1 ∈ Φ¯(ht) and s2 ∈ Φ¯(h∗), the distance d(s1, s2) < δ. In par-
ticular, there exists s∗ ∈ Φ¯(h∗) such that d(s∗, st) < δ. Since both strategies are a best response and the distance between
the strategies is at most δ, the order of actions in (A′, c) must be the same as in (A∗, c). In particular, this means that
BeliefsToStrategy(ht) and BeliefsToStrategy(h∗) use the same order of actions in their interval structure. In
fact, they differ only over a set of types of size d(BeliefsToStrategy(ht),BeliefsToStrategy(h∗)) < δ. Since utility
is bounded, we have:∣∣u˜(BeliefsToStrategy(ht),h∗)− u˜(BeliefsToStrategy(h∗),h∗)∣∣
= ∣∣u˜(BeliefsToStrategy(ht),h∗)− u˜(s∗,h∗)∣∣< cδ,
where c > 0 is some constant. Aggregating all three bounds together we have:∣∣u˜(BeliefsToStrategy(ht),ht)− u˜(BeliefsToStrategy(ht),h∗)∣∣< δ,∣∣u˜(BeliefsToStrategy(ht),h∗)− u˜(s∗,h∗)∣∣< cδ,∣∣u˜(st ,ht)− u˜(s∗,h∗)∣∣< δ.
Hence, we obtain that, for any δ, there exists a T so that for all t > T , the following holds:∣∣u˜(BeliefsToStrategy(ht),ht)− u˜(st ,ht)∣∣< c′δ, for some ﬁnite c′ > 0. 
Theorem 3 guarantees that if FP converges, then an -Nash equilibrium is necessarily obtained at some ﬁnite iteration.
Furthermore, the proof structure allows another practical simpliﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, before applying BeliefsToStrategy,
we can simplify ht by ﬁltering out all actions that appear with numerically negligible probability (i.e. below the threshold
of δ) and renormalising.11
6. Simultaneous auctions
In previous sections we discussed an algorithm for ﬁnding equilibria in G-FACTs, and an implementation for linear utility
functions. In the current section, we apply the algorithm to a setting where bidders participate in multiple simultaneous,
single-sided, sealed-bid auctions.12 Simultaneous auctions are a natural generalisation of single-item auctions when multiple
items are available for sale from different sellers. As we discussed in Section 2, existing computational techniques cannot
be applied to this setting due to continuous type spaces, while discretisation of the type space comes at the expense
of computationally feasibility. That is, the settings with more than a few discrete types and bid levels are beyond the
computational reach of most techniques.
The purpose of analysing this setting is two-fold. First, we demonstrate the eﬃcacy of our algorithm for a complex setting
where no analytical solution exists, and give convergence results. Second, we demonstrate that our algorithmic technique
can be used to contribute to the auction literature by providing an extensive empirical characterisation of the equilibrium
bidding behaviour in simultaneous auctions. This empirical analysis is augmented in the next section, where we derive an
analytical characterisation for a basic setting and show that the equilibria found for that setting match those that are found
with our numerical approach.
In particular, in our experiments we focus on simultaneous Vickrey (i.e., second-price) auctions. However, any other pric-
ing (e.g., ﬁrst-price or all-pay) could be chosen as this does not affect the algorithm (but affects the equilibrium strategies).
The auctions are simultaneous in that a bidder needs to make a decision on how much to bid in each auction without
knowing any of the outcomes (unlike sequential auctions where the winner of an auction is known before a bid is placed
in another auction). For this setting, it has been shown in prior decision-theoretic work [43] that, even though each indi-
vidual auction is incentive compatible (bidding the true value for the item being auctioned is a dominant strategy), and
even when the items are perfect substitutes (the bidder does not derive extra beneﬁt from winning more than one item),
a bidder is often better off bidding in multiple auctions and shading their bids, as opposed to choosing a single auction
11 A similar thresholding procedure was applied to mixed strategies in Ganzfried et al. [53].
12 We note that a variation of the algorithm has also been successfully applied to a more complex double auction setting in [54]. See Section 8 for more
details.
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in type, which makes ﬁnding the equilibrium bidding strategies a challenging task. In this section, we extend this work
to a game-theoretic analysis in which all players can participate in all auctions, and the aim is to compute an equilibrium
strategy. Here, we consider a wide range of combinatorial structures, including substitutes and complements.
6.1. Simultaneous Vickrey auctions
We consider a setting with k simultaneous sealed-bid single-item Vickrey auctions. The items sold in different auctions
are heterogeneous. The set of auctions (equivalently, items) is denoted by K = {1, . . . ,k}. The set of players N corresponds
to the bidders. Each bidder has a single-dimensional privately-known type θ which is i.i.d. sampled from a c.d.f. F with
continuous support on [0,1]. F is assumed to be common knowledge. The ﬁnite action space is given by a set of joint
bids deﬁned as follows. Each auction has a ﬁnite set of admissible bids levels B ⊂ R+ , and a bidder chooses a bid for each
auction.14 For simplicity, we furthermore assume that all auctions have the same bid levels and these are equally spaced
(both of these simpliﬁcations can be trivially relaxed but we choose this restriction to reduce the number of parameters to
consider). Thus, the action space is A = Bk . Note that simultaneous auctions with discrete bids and continuous types are
an instance of G-FACTs since the action space is ﬁnite, but the types are continuous. The only piece missing from a full
speciﬁcation of a Bayesian game is the utility function, which we deﬁne next.
While the type of a bidder is single dimensional, we assume that the bidders have combinatorial preferences: i.e., the
items are heterogeneous and may range from perfect substitutes to perfect complements and combinations of these. This is
achieved by a function φ : 2K → R, common to all bidders which speciﬁes a complementarity structure of the auctions. The
value that a bidder with type θ derives from winning a subset of items η ⊆ K is given by the product φ(η)θ . Notice that
the relative values of bundles are the same across bidders. In essence, the type is a scaling parameter: if bidder 1 has type
x and bidder 2 has type 3x, this means that bidder 2’s value for each bundle is 3 times as high as the value of bidder 1.
We acknowledge that single-dimensional types are more restrictive than multi-dimensional types that allow each bidder to
have his own complementarity structure. Nevertheless, our restricted model is a good approximation for scenarios where
items are likely to have a common complementarity structure (e.g., the bundle of left and right shoes is valuable, while
each item in isolation is not).
As an example consider the case of two auctions (K = {1,2}) that we study in detail in the rest of the paper. Let
α = φ({1}), β = φ({2}), and γ = φ({1,2}) denote the value from winning only the ﬁrst auction, only the second auction,
and both auctions, respectively. Then, having α = β = γ = 1 corresponds to a setting of perfect substitutes and free disposal.
That is, a bidder does not gain from winning multiple items, but there is no cost either (not including any additional
payments from winning multiple auctions). Our computational and analytical techniques do not rely on the assumption of
free disposal, and, for completeness, we consider complementarity structures where free disposal does not hold: i.e., the
values 0 γ min(α,β). At its extreme, γ = 0, we have valuations where winning both items results in zero value (this
could be interpreted as the cost of disposal of the second item being equal to the independent value of the ﬁrst item).
Furthermore, α = β = 0 and γ = 1 represents the case with perfect complements. That is, a bidder only receives utility
from winning both items. Finally, setting γ = α + β means that the items are independent.
In addition, we can model auctions selling heterogeneous items. For example, β = 2α and 2α  γ  3α model the case
when the item sold in the second auction is twice as valuable as the item from the ﬁrst auction, and these items exhibit
some degree of substitutability. Such preferences could arise, for example, when the same type of item is sold in two
different quantities (e.g., 1-liter and 2-liter cartons of milk), but having both is more than a bidder typically needs.
The assumption of a common complementarity structure φ enables us to model combinatorial valuations while keep-
ing bidder types single-dimensional. Alternatively, true combinatorial valuations would endow each bidder with his own
combinatorial structure, making each type 2|K |-dimensional. This more general model is left open for future work (our ex-
tension to multi-parameter domains in Appendix A.2 may be helpful). Thus, in the present work we focus on the common
complementarity structure.
Given a complementarity structure φ, the expected utility of a bidder from playing action a ∈ A is:
uˆ(θ,a,h) = θ
∑
η⊆K
φ(η)q(a, η,h)− cost(a,h) (5)
where:
• q(a, η,h) is the probability that playing an action (bids) a ∈ A results in winning exactly the set η of auctions, given the
distribution of actions from the opponents, h. In Appendix B we show how this probability is calculated (note that this
is not trivial since we have discrete bids and therefore need to take into account a tie breaking rule).
13 Two items are substitutable if the utility from winning both of them is less than the sum of the utilities for each individual item. Similarly, two items
are complementary if the utility from winning both of them is more than the sum of the utilities for each individual item.
14 We argue that having a ﬁnite set of bids is not necessarily restrictive in practice, since bids are often rounded to an appropriate level (e.g. to the nearest
dollar amount for small bids, the nearest ten-fold for larger bids, etc.). In addition, the set of admissible bids can be further restricted by the auctioneer to
increase seller revenue [46,55].
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Experimental settings.
Parameter Value(s)
Number of auctions (k) 2
Number of bidders (n) 2,5,10
Number of bid levels per auction (|B|) 2,5,10
Type probability distribution (F ) Uniform([0,1])
Complementarity structure (α,β) varies
Complementarity structure (γ ) 0, 0.05, 0.1, . . . , 2.95, 3
Initialisation of FP beliefs random
Number of runs for each setting 30
Number of FP iterations per run 5000
• cost(a,h) is the expected payment when placing action a and given distribution h. Appendix B shows how this is
calculated (as can be seen in the appendix, note that the expected payment is simply the sum of the expected payment
for each auction, and so is much easier to calculate since this can be done independently for each auction).
Importantly, note that expected utility uˆ is linear in θ , which allows us to apply the algorithms from Section 5.
6.2. Numerical results
In this section we present equilibrium results obtained by running the ﬁctitious play algorithm described in Figs. 1, 3, 4,
and 5. The algorithm in Fig. 3 is instantiated using Eq. (5). The details of the tie-breaking rule appear in Appendix B
(throughout the analysis we use the exact tie breaking rule unless speciﬁed otherwise). In the following, we start with the
experimental setup in Section 6.2.1. Then, in Section 6.2.2 we measure the empirical convergence of the algorithm to an
-Nash equilibrium. The actual equilibria obtained are ﬁrst discussed with only 2 bid levels per auction in Section 6.2.3 for
homogeneous items, and in Section 6.2.4 for heterogeneous items. In Section 6.2.5 these results are extended to more than
2 bid levels.
6.2.1. Experimental setup
A game is speciﬁed by the number of auctions, the number of bidders, a set of possible bids, a complementarity structure,
and a distribution of agents’ types. In all of the experiments, we focus on 2 auctions, and a uniform distribution of types
between 0 and 1. We begin the numerical investigation with the simplest possible setting: 2 bidders, 2 bid levels per auction,
and complementarity structures where the individual value of each item is the same (i.e., the items sold at both auctions
are identical). In this setting, we ﬁnd an equilibrium for each degree of complementarity from substitutes to complements.
The observed equilibria for this simple setting enable us to identify some properties that continue to hold in the more
complicated setting we consider next: auctions with more than 2 bidders, and auctions selling different items. We then
further expand the setting by considering more than 2 bid levels.
An overview of various experimental settings is given in Table 1. Although we tested with many other values as well,
these are representative of the results that we obtained. The bid levels in B are equally spaced between 0 and 1. This means
that, if the number of bid levels is 2, then B = {0,1}. On the other hand, if this is set to 5, then B = {0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1.0},
etc. Recall that the number of bid levels is per auction. This means that, for example, if this number is 10, then the total
number of actions for a bidder when there are 2 simultaneous auctions is 102 = 100. Furthermore, random initialisation of
the FP beliefs means that the initial probability of each action is set randomly between 0 and 1, and then normalised so that
the probabilities sum to one (note that this is different from having each action played with equal probability). These values
are sampled anew for different runs of the same experiment. Therefore, the (only) difference between runs is the initial FP
beliefs (since the algorithm itself is deterministic). The aim in having multiple runs is to see whether or not different initial
beliefs result in different equilibrium strategies being computed. When multiple runs converge to the same -equilibria, we
are more conﬁdent that a true equilibrium has been identiﬁed as we describe next. We run each experiment 30 times to
obtain statistically signiﬁcant results based on 95% conﬁdence intervals.
6.2.2. Convergence and scalability
In this section we empirically analyse to what extent the results converge, and the computational runtime required as
we scale the number of bidders and bid levels. These results provide a useful insight into the practical applications of the
algorithm. In more detail, we measure convergence in terms of the size of  in the -Nash equilibrium (see Deﬁnition 2
in Section 3). Recall that the  of a given strategy s is given by the difference between the utility obtained by playing
a best response s∗ to hs and the utility from playing s when the action distribution is hs: (s) = u˜(s∗,hs) − u˜(s,hs). In
particular, we would like to measure the  of the strategy that can be constructed from the current FP beliefs, ht , using
the BeliefsToStrategy algorithm. Thus, we set s = BeliefsToStrategy(ht) and hs = ht . In addition, to obtain a
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described in Table 1. For each combination of parameters, 30 simulations were run.
unit-free measure of convergence so that we can compare different settings,15 we use a standard approach to normalise the
difference, resulting in the so-called relative error [56]:
error(t) = u˜(s
∗,ht)− u˜(BeliefsToStrategy(ht),ht)
u˜(s∗,ht)
. (6)
Note that the error is guaranteed to be between 0 (the equilibrium) and 1 (as far as a strategy can be from the equilibrium).
The results using this measure appear in Fig. 6, which shows the percentage of runs that converge to a given error
within a number of iterations, for all settings described in Table 1, and where each setting is run 30 times, and α = 0.7 and
β = 1 (the results are very similar for other values of α and β). This ﬁgure shows that virtually all runs of the algorithm
converge to -equilibrium with a small error. Moreover, as the number of iterations increases, the percentage of runs that
are within  of the equilibrium keeps increasing. This indicates that, on average, once an -equilibrium for a given  is
reached, running extra iterations does not lead to divergence.
A potential weakness of the -equilibrium concept is that, even though the gain from deviation may be very small,
the -equilibrium strategy may be arbitrarily far away from an exact equilibrium strategy (see, e.g., [57]). We address this
concern in two ways. First, we run the same settings starting from different initial beliefs. If the algorithm consistently
converges to the same strategy,16 this increases our conﬁdence that the true equilibrium is obtained (note that the converse
is not true, since converging to different strategies could simply mean that there exist multiple equilibria). We found that,
using our algorithm, all of the simulations for 2 bid levels (Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4), as well as the simulations with more
bid levels for auctions selling weakly complementary items (i.e., γ  α + β), converged in the latter stronger sense.
Second, we compare the strategies with analytical results for settings where these can be derived. In particular, for
a special case of 2 bidders, 2 auctions, and 2 bid levels, we are able to derive equilibria analytically (our derivation is
discussed in Section 7.1). We see that the analytical results are identical to the equilibrium results obtained computationally
in Section 6.2.3. Thus, in this special case, -equilibria obtained numerically are approximating exact pure-strategy equilibria.
Although we do not have a theoretical proof of convergence in general, we note that the equilibria we obtain for variants
of this special case (e.g., with more than 2 bidders or with heterogeneous items) follow the same structure, which we take
as a reasonable evidence that these approximate equilibria are close (in terms of the strategy, not just the utility) to exact
equilibria.
We now consider the amount of computation required, both in terms of the number of iterations, as well as time
elapsed before convergence to an -Nash equilibrium. In these experiments, we choose error = 0.01 (i.e., where the error
is no more than one percent of the total utility), but the results show similar trends for other values. In particular, we are
interested to see how our algorithm scales for the simultaneous auctions setting with k = 2 auctions, when we increase
the number of bidders and the number of discrete bid levels. Although each experiment is run 30 times with different
initial beliefs, the results in this section show the average over the 15 runs with the lowest runtime. We do this because
the results vary depending on the initial beliefs, and we see that, while in most cases the results converge within a couple
of hundred iterations, there are a few outliers which skew the results and take much longer or do not converge to the
required error within the maximum numbers of iterations (which was set to 2500 for these particular experiments). We
avoid these outliers by taking the top half of the runs. Furthermore, we argue that, in practice, it is possible to run a number
15 Equilibrium utility for different complementary structures could be very different. Thus, the same absolute difference may constitute 1% of utility for
one complementarity structure, and 200% for another.
16 As measured, for example, by a negligibly small Euclidean distance between the action distributions from different runs after a ﬁxed number of
iterations.
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structures with β = 1. Here, we use the exact tie breaking rule (note that the number of bidders does not affect the time per iteration when using the
approximate tie breaking rule). The number of bid levels is set to |B| = 10. Results are averaged over the 15 fastest of 30 runs. The error bars denote the
95% conﬁdence intervals.
Fig. 8. Average number of iterations required to reach error = 0.01 (left) and time per iteration (right) for different values of |B| and different preference
structures with β = 1. The number of bidders is set to n = 10, and the approximate tie breaking rule is used. Results are averaged over the 15 fastest of 30
runs. The error bars denote the 95% conﬁdence intervals.
of experiments in parallel to see which one converges ﬁrst, which would have the same effect. All of the experiments were
run on a Linux cluster with 2.27 GHz Nehalem processors and the simulation was implemented in Java.
There are two factors that determine the total computation time: the number of iterations required and the computation
time for each iteration. The effect of the ﬁrst factor can be seen in Figs. 7 (left) and 8 (left) which show the average number
of iterations required to reach the equilibrium, as we increase the number of bidders, respectively the number of bid levels
per auction, for a variety of preference structures. This result shows that the number of required iterations always increases
as the number of bidders increases, but typically ﬂattens out as we increase the number of bid levels. An increase in the
number of iterations is indicative of the diﬃculty of the problem, and this suggests that problems with more bidders are
more challenging to solve, which seems intuitive. In most cases, however, the increase seems to be linear or even sublinear,
and so has relatively little impact on the ﬁnal computation. Interestingly, the preference structure also has a large effect on
the diﬃculty of the problem, and generally increasing the asymmetry between the two auctions increases the number of
iterations required. On the other hand, increasing the number of bid levels merely increases the granularity and, for a given
relative error, this has little effect on the number of iterations needed to converge.
Whereas the algorithm scales relatively well in terms of the number of iterations for the simultaneous auctions domain,
it is less promising when we consider the computation required for each iteration. Here, the computation required is mainly
due to computing the utility lines (the UtilityLines algorithm in Fig. 3, which requires ﬁnding the slope and intercept
in Eq. (5)), and computing the best response (i.e., the BestResponse algorithm in Fig. 4).17 We ﬁrst consider the effect of
the number of bidders which, due to the tie breaking rule, affects the computation of utility lines. Note that, from Appendix
B, we can see that, to compute the exact probability of winning, we need to consider all possible numbers of ties in each
auction. As a result, for m = 2 auctions the computation required scales in the order O (n3) with the number of bidders. The
empirical results in Fig. 7 (right) are for the same settings as before, and show the average real time (in seconds) required
17 Note that the computation of the BeliefsToStrategy algorithm is negligible compared to the other algorithms since the main part consists of
sorting the actions by slope. Furthermore, the BeliefsToStrategy algorithm is only required to compute the relative error (Eq. (6)), and the strategy
itself once the process has converged.
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to compute an iteration, as we increase the number of bidders. Note that, as we can expect, the number of bidders has a
large impact on the computation, but the preference structure does not.
Clearly, we can do much better by simply using an approximation of the tie breaking rule, and a simple approximation
which scales well with the number of bidders is given in Appendix B.1. Using this approximation, the increase in compu-
tation due to an increase in the number of bidders becomes negligible. Furthermore, we empirically consider the additional
error (in terms of the -Nash) introduced by this approximation (we do so by computing the best response both with and
without the approximation, and computing the error in both cases). From this we can determine that the error decreases
and goes to zero as the number of bid levels goes to inﬁnity, but empirically we ﬁnd that the error is already very small
for small numbers of bid levels. For example, the average additional error is less than 0.003 when the number of bid levels
is 20.
In terms of the runtime when increasing the number of bid levels, in the case of k = 2 the number of actions is equal to
|B|2, where |B| is the number of bid levels, and so the time complexity of a single iteration is at least O (|B|2). Furthermore,
as discussed in Section 5.1, the time complexity for ﬁnding the best response using our algorithm is O ((|B|2)2) = O (|B|4).
This is consistent with the empirical results depicted in Fig. 8 (right) which show the time per iteration when using the
approximate tie breaking rule, as the number of discrete bid levels increases.18 As a result, for k = 2, we can easily compute
results for settings of 100 discrete bid levels per auction.
6.2.3. Equilibrium results for homogeneous items
We ﬁrst consider a simple setting where the items sold at each auction are identical, the set of bids is B = {0,1}, and
there are only n = 2 bidders. Given that the auctions are identical, we set α = β = 1, and vary the value of γ as speciﬁed in
Table 1 and explained in Section 6.1. This value ranges from γ = 0, which models a setting of extreme substitutes without
free disposal, to γ = 3 which corresponds to complements. In-between are perfect substitutes (γ = 1) and independent
auctions (γ = α + β = 2). In what follows we analyse the results after 5000 iterations of the ﬁctitious play algorithm (this
number was found to be suﬃciently large for experiments to converge to a very small error).
To illustrate the results, Fig. 9 shows the strategy and corresponding utility lines generated by the BeliefsToStrategy
procedure at the end of a particular run for a setting with γ = 1.4 (i.e., a representative value where agents have substi-
tutable preferences). This ﬁgure shows that, for this setting, all 4 possible actions are played with non-zero probability.
Moreover, as can be expected, agents with higher types bid higher. Speciﬁcally, agents with a low type play (0,0); agents
with a very high type play (1,1), and in-between types play either (0,1) or (1,0). From this example we can see several
interesting trends. First, the slopes of the utility lines are increasing as expected, except for actions (0,1) and (1,0) where
the slopes seem to be identical. Second, the actions (0,1) and (1,0) seem to be played with equal probability (note that the
type interval is of equal size and types are uniformly distributed). In fact, however, the ﬁctitious play beliefs assign almost
equal probabilities to (1,0) and (0,1), and the slopes are almost identical. Furthermore, the slopes oscillate: if at iteration t
the action (1,0) has a slightly higher slope, then at iteration t + 1 the action (0,1) has a higher slope. This is because the
best-response strategy also oscillates, and only one of the actions (1,0) or (0,1) is played with non-zero probability in best
response, never both, and these two actions alternate. This illustrates why a special BeliefsToStrategy procedure is
needed to ﬁnd an equilibrium and why simply taking the best response does not result in an equilibrium strategy.
In more detail, this ﬂuctuating behaviour mimics the FP dynamics in games of complete information such as matching
pennies, where the best response for the mismatching player is heads whenever the probability of playing tails is above one
18 We note that there is considerable scope for optimising the code, e.g. by using a more eﬃcient algorithm for computing the upper envelope or by
detecting and removing dominated utility lines (see Section 5.1).
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Table 2
Strategy corresponding to beliefs h.
Value range bid
0 v  h(0,0) (0,0)
h(0,0) v  h(0,0)+ h(1,0) (1,0)
h(0,0)+ h(1,0) v  h(0,0)+ h(1,0)+ h(0,1) (0,1)
h(0,0)+ h(1,0)+ h(0,1) v  1 (1,1)
half, and tails otherwise. There, the beliefs asymptotically approach equal probability of playing heads and tails yielding an
equilibrium strategy. Similarly, here the FP beliefs for actions (1,0) and (0,1) become increasingly similar as the number of
iterations increases. However, in contrast to complete information games where FP beliefs deﬁne a unique mixed strategy,
in games of incomplete information, FP beliefs do not correspond to a single strategy. Thus, we need to convert FP beliefs
into a strategy that induces these beliefs and is roughly a best response to them. The BeliefsToStrategy procedure
accomplishes this goal as we proved in Section 5.2. Furthermore, in Section 7.1 we formally show that the strategy found by
the BeliefsToStrategy procedure in fact corresponds to the analytically derived strategy for the case of n = 2 bidders,
2 bid levels, and 2 auctions. In particular, we can see that, in equilibrium the two actions (1,0) and (0,1) are always played
with identical probability as expected.19
Next, we consider the equilibrium strategies for different values of γ . We can plot action distributions more concisely
than equilibrium strategies and take advantage of BeliefsToStrategy to map each action distribution to a strategy. To
this end, Fig. 10 plots action distributions for each value of the complementarity parameter γ between 0 and 3. This ﬁgure
(and other ﬁgures that follow) shows action distributions (i.e., FP beliefs) after 5000 FP iterations, and averaged over 30 runs.
We omit the error bars in the ﬁgures because the conﬁdence intervals are very small and cannot be seen. This shows that,
starting from different initial beliefs, the beliefs converge to the same action distribution. An equilibrium strategy can be
recovered from the action distributions by applying the BeliefsToStrategy procedure. The resulting strategy appears
in Table 2.
As can be seen, the action distributions appear to be continuous in the complementarity parameter γ (see Fig. 10).
Furthermore, the values of γ can be partitioned into three intervals, each corresponding to a different set of actions being
played with non-zero probability. For low values of γ (in the case of highly substitutable items), action (1,1) is never
played; in the mid-range, all 4 actions are played with non-zero probability; in the case of complementarities (1,0) and
(0,1) are never played. We denote these intervals by [0, γˆ1], [γˆ1,2], and [2,∞], where γˆ1 is the lowest value of γ for
which the bid (1,1) is played in equilibrium. As can be seen in Fig. 10, for this particular setting the value of γˆ1 ≈ 1.2.20
Furthermore, as soon as γ reaches the value of additive valuations (γ = α+β = 2), the bids (1,0) and (0,1) are not played
at all as the agents try avoiding winning a single item. Interestingly, this is consistent with existing analytical results in the
literature for continuous bids whereby only equal-bid pairs are played for items that display complementarity [1] (when the
auctions are identical).
Table 3 further analyses the strategy and shows that equilibrium action distributions are monotone in γ within each of
the intervals (the values for γ = ∞ are based on simulations for large (but ﬁnite) values of γ ). Furthermore, the probability
of playing the “highest” possible bid of (1,1) increases as the items become more complementary. In fact, we observe that,
19 It is worth noting that, in the homogeneous case, there actually exists a continuum of equilibrium strategies. This is because the agents are indifferent
between playing (1,0) and (0,1). For example, the strategy where the intervals for (0,1) and (1,0) in Fig. 9 are swapped is also an equilibrium. Also, there
exist equilibria with more intervals. However, all of these equilibria result in the same action distribution, and this action distribution is unique (see also
Section 7.1).
20 We derive the exact value in Section 7.1.
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Equilibrium analysis for homogeneous items and 2 bid levels.
γ ∈ [0, γˆ1] γ ∈ [γˆ1,2] γ ∈ [2,∞] γ = ∞
f (0,0) decreases increases decreases 0
f (1,0) = f (0,1) increases decreases 0 0
f (1,1) 0 increases increases 1
Fig. 11. Action distributions for auctions selling homogeneous items.
in the limit, the probability of bidding (1,1) approaches 1 from below. However, for any ﬁnite γ , the bid (0,0) is played in
equilibrium by the types that are small enough, resulting in a positive h(0,0).
In the remainder of this section, we show that our technique can be used to derive equilibria for more than 2 bidders.
The results for 5 and 10 bidders are shown in Fig. 11. We observe the pattern identiﬁed for 2 bidders continues to holds for
5 and 10 bidders. In particular, we observe the same types of interval, where only the value of γˆ1 (the lowest γ for which
the action (1,1) is played) changes. Furthermore, the monotonicity results shown in Table 3 are identical for these intervals.
Comparing across the graphs, we notice that γˆ1 increases with the number of bidders. That is, the items must display more
complementarity for (1,1) to be played in equilibrium when there is more competition. This is a result of an increasing
cost associated with the bid (1,1): the same strategy s results in a higher (second) price as the number of bidders playing
the strategy increases. This leads to a higher expected cost of winning with the bid of 1, discouraging bidding 1 unless the
type is suﬃciently high. This effect is also reﬂected in a lower probability of playing (1,0), (0,1), and (1,1) across γ when
n = 10 compared to when n = 5.
6.2.4. Equilibrium results for heterogeneous items
Our next set of results considers auctions selling different items and where an agent has different valuations for these
items. To illustrate the effect of the degree of asymmetry, we run two sets of experiments for different relative values of
the items. In the ﬁrst set, the value of the item sold in one auction is 0.7 of the value of the item sold in the other auction
(α = 0.7, β = 1). In the second set of experiments, one item is much less valuable: its value is only 0.3 of the value of the
other item (α = 0.3, β = 1). Notice that the case of additive valuations, beyond which the items become complementary,
occurs at γ = α + β , which is γ = 1.7 for the ﬁrst case and γ = 1.3 in the second.
Action distributions for each setting with 2, 5 and 10 bidders are plotted in Fig. 12. As before, these results are averaged
over 30 runs. Since the item sold in the second auction is more desirable, we can see that, in equilibrium, (0,1) is played
more often than (1,0): the curve h(0,1) is above h(1,0) for all values of γ . Furthermore, we note that, even though the
actions (1,0) and (0,1) are played on adjacent intervals, the switching of the optimal best response in each iteration, which
we observed in the homogeneous case, does not occur here. After suﬃciently many iterations, the bid (1,0) is always
selected by lower types, and the bid (0,1) is always selected by the higher types. Thus, Table 2 still provides an equilibrium
strategy.
We observe similarities in the equilibrium structure of homogeneous and heterogeneous cases. After identifying the
regions where the set of bids played with non-zero probability does not change, we notice that as in the homogeneous
case, the probability of each bid within a region is monotonic in γ . The bids (1,0) and (0,1) are not symmetric when items
are heterogeneous, resulting in more regions. For n = 5 and n = 10, there are ﬁve regions summarised in Table 4. Comparing
the graphs for n = 5 and n = 10, we notice that as in the homogeneous case, the probability of bidding (0,0) is higher for
n = 10 while the probabilities of the other bids are lower. Comparing two complementarity structures α = 0.7 and α = 0.3,
we observe that the bid (1,0) is played more often when the item is worth 0.7 than when it is worth 0.3 (symmetrically,
the bid (0,1) is played less often). This corresponds to a higher competition for the item when it is more desirable.
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Table 4
Equilibrium analysis for heterogeneous items and 2 bid levels. The bid (1,1) is played with positive probability for γ > γˆ2. The bid (1,0) is played with
zero probability for γ < γˆ1 (γˆ1 is zero for n = 5 and n = 10) and γ > γˆ3. The bid (0,1) is played with zero probability for γ > γˆ4.
γ ∈ [0, γˆ1] γ ∈ [γˆ1, γˆ2] γ ∈ [γˆ2, γˆ3] γ ∈ [γˆ3, γˆ4] γ ∈ [γˆ4,∞] γ = ∞
f (0,0) decreases decreases increases decreases decreases 0
f (1,0) 0 increases decreases 0 0 0
f (0,1) increases increases decreases decreases 0 0
f (1,1) 0 0 increases increases increases 1
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Fig. 14. Substitutable items: equilibrium strategies for 2 bidders with 5 bid levels.
6.2.5. Equilibrium results for auctions with more than two bid levels
The strategies analysed so far were limited to two bid levels. However, our technique can be applied to any number of
bid levels. Here we discuss results for ten bid levels, but similar results hold for other bid levels. With more than two bid
levels, there is no easy way to represent the results concisely for each value of γ as we did before (since the number of
possible actions is large). Therefore, we select a few representative values of γ to illustrate the types of equilibria we ﬁnd.
To this end, Fig. 13(a) shows equilibria for homogeneous items with a small degree of complementarity. The bid submitted
in each auction is plotted as a function of type. We see that, consistent with the two-bid and continuous case (see [10]),
in the case of homogeneous items, the bids in both auctions are the same (i.e., the lines coincide) and are given by an
increasing step function. In fact, we observe that for any γ > α + β , the equilibrium follows this structure.
In the case of complementary heterogeneous items, the strategy follows the same form: the bid in each auction is
an increasing step function, which is also consistent with the results for 2 bid levels (see, e.g., Fig. 9(a)). This can be
seen in Fig. 13(b), which shows equilibrium strategies for heterogeneous items with a small degree of complementarity.
We tried many other parameter settings (i.e., changing the number of bidders, bid levels, and complementarity structures
with γ > α + β), and equilibria for all of them followed this structure. Moreover, we noticed that, for high degrees of
complementarity, the step functions coincide as in the homogeneous case.
Our results for substitutable items (i.e., γ < α + β) are not as conclusive for two reasons. First, even though convergence
to -equilibrium with a low error was always observed, multiple runs did not always produce the same equilibrium. Second,
we could not discern any general patterns as we did in the complementary case. To illustrate this, we plot equilibrium
strategies for two settings where multiple runs led to the same equilibrium. For weakly substitutable items, the equilibrium
resembles the increasing step functions which characterised equilibria for complementary items. An example of this is
in Fig. 14(a). However, when items are stronger substitutes, equilibrium is more diﬃcult to describe. Fig. 14(b) shows
equilibrium when items are close to being perfect substitutes.
Before proceeding to an analytical characterisation of equilibria, we note that all of the numerical results described in
this section are for two simultaneous auctions. The algorithm is applicable to any number of auctions, however, we chose
to study this case as it is already complex enough (and has not been solved before). Furthermore, computing the fair tie-
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as can be seen in Appendix B). We emphasise that settings with 3 and more simultaneous auctions can be studied with our
FP algorithm given an approximation of the tie-breaking rule.
In the next section we provide analytical characterisation of equilibria. The equilibria that we derive there analytically
conﬁrm our numerical results from in Section 6.2.3.
7. Analytical characterisation of equilibria for linear utilities
This section provides an analytical characterisation of equilibria for the case when agents’ utilities are linear in type (as
deﬁned in Section 5). In more detail, we reduce the problem of ﬁnding equilibria to solving systems of polynomial equations.
While this characterisation holds for all games with linear utilities, deriving equilibrium relies on the ability to solve the
systems exactly. We demonstrate that it can be done for simultaneous auction games studied in Section 6.2.3. Speciﬁcally,
we analytically derive the equilibria and prove their uniqueness for each complementarity structure in simultaneous auctions
for two homogeneous items with two bid levels and two bidders.
We compare these equilibria to the empirical results in Section 6.2.3. This comparison is important since, even though the
empirical results generally converge to a very small error, the small error only means that deviating from the approximate
equilibrium strategy results in at most a small beneﬁt. However, there are no guarantees that the approximate equilibrium
is similar to the theoretical Nash equilibrium (in terms of the action distributions). Given this, the results in this section
conﬁrm that the -Nash equilibria discovered for this setting are the same as the unique exact equilibria derived below, and
provide a validation for the ﬁctitious play approach (at least in the simultaneous auctions domain). This holds for the entire
range of complementarity structures for identical auctions studied in Section 6.2.3.
Our analytical characterisation begins with the analysis of best response. We continue using the best response represen-
tation from Section 5.1. Thus, a best response is speciﬁed by a set of m′ actions A′ ⊆ A ordered according to the slope and
the corresponding intervals (represented by an increasing vector c ∈Rm′−1) on which each action is played: action a′j is the
best-response action on the interval given by [c j−1, c j]. This representation is without loss of generality for pure-strategy
best response: the actions of any best response are increasing in the slope of the utility lines21 and a single action is played
for each type. Whereas in Section 5.1 we presented an algorithmic procedure for ﬁnding a best response (see Fig. 4), we
now provide an analytical characterisation. First, we give a few observations that follow immediately from the best-response
structure.
Recall from equilibrium results for single-item auctions with continuous actions that the equilibrium action (i.e., bid)
increases in type. However, in our model the set of actions is discrete and may have a more complex underlying structure
(as would be the case, for example, in the simultaneous auctions model, where bids are not single dimensional), and there is
no self-evident total order among them. To remedy this, we consider slopes of the utility lines. These slopes provide a total
order over actions. As we noted in Observation 1, the slopes of actions played in a best response strategy increase in type.
Since an equilibrium is a best response, the same applies to equilibrium actions, providing an equilibrium monotonicity
condition.
Observation 2. The slope of the utility envelope of an equilibrium strategy increases in type.
A direct consequence of this is another observation.
Observation 3. If all slopes are distinct in equilibrium, an action cannot be played on more than one interval.
For a given action distribution h, we say that ai  a j if the slope of ai ’s utility line is smaller than the slope of a j ’s utility
line. With this notation, a best response is characterised by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given a set of available actions A = {a1  · · · am}, the pair (A′ = {a′1  · · · a′m′ }, c) is a pure-strategy best response to
the action distribution h if and only if the following equations are satisﬁed:
A′ ⊆ A, (7)
0< c1 < · · · < cm′−1 < 1, (8)
uˆ
(
c j,a
′
j,h
)= uˆ(c j,a′j+1,h) ∀1 j m′ − 1, (9)
uˆ
(
0,a′1,h
)
 uˆ(0,ak,h) ∀ak ≺ a′1, (10)
uˆ
(
c j,a
′
j,h
)
 uˆ(c j,ak,h) ∀1 j m′ a′j ≺ ak ≺ a′j+1 (11)
21 This follows from the fact that the best-response function (see Eq. (3)) is convex.
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Proof. See Appendix C. 
The analytical characterisation of a best-response provides a partial characterisation of equilibrium: each equilibrium
strategy is a best response. To be an equilibrium, the best-response strategy must be a best-response to itself. We formalise
this in the theorem below.
Theorem 4. A strategy s is a pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium of the game Γ = 〈N, A,u(·),Θ, F (·)〉 with uˆ(θ, s(θ),hs) linear in
θ if and only if :
s(θ) = a′j | θ ∈ [c j−1, c j]
where (A′ = {a′1  · · · a′m′ }, c) satisﬁes Eqs. (7)–(11) as well as:
h
(
a′j
)= F (c j)− F (c j−1) ∀1 j m′, (12)
h(a j) = 0 ∀a j /∈ A′. (13)
Proof. A strategy is an equilibrium if and only if it is a best response (and thus can be represented by a pair (A′, c)) to
itself: i.e., to the action distribution it induces. Eqs. (7)–(11) ensure the strategy is a best response. The action distribution
corresponding to a strategy (A′, c) is easy to express analytically: the probability of playing an action a′j ∈ A′ is the same
as the probability that the type is from the interval [c j−1, c j] (Eq. (12)) while the probabilities of all other actions are zero
(Eq. (13)). 
A direct way of searching for an equilibrium is for each possible subset of actions A′ ⊆ A to check whether there
exist parameters c satisfying best-response (8)–(11) and action distribution (12)–(13) equations. Although in general the
equations can be arbitrarily complex depending on the distribution of types and number of players, they are almost always
numerically solvable (see, e.g., [58–61]). A complete analytical characterisation is tractable when the number of actions is
small. In the next section, we provide such a characterisation for the simultaneous auctions setting with 2 bid levels studied
in Section 6.2.3.
7.1. Two identical items, two bidders, two bids per auction, uniform distribution of types
In this section, we use the above characterisation to provide an analytical derivation of the equilibrium for the simulta-
neous auctions setting studied numerically in Section 6.2.3. Speciﬁcally, we restrict our attention to 2 auctions each selling
an identical item and 2 bidders with types uniformly distribution between 0 and 1. Furthermore, there are 2 bid levels per
auction: 0 and 1. The set of possible joint bids is therefore A = {(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)}. As before, we set α = β = 1. The
only remaining complementarity parameter is γ , which determines how much more or less an agent values having both
items. In the following, we analytically derive equilibria as a function of γ .
We start by making several observations. First, due to uniform distributions, the bid distribution in Eq. (12) induced by
a strategy (A′, c) becomes:
h
(
a′j; c
)= F (c j)− F (c j−1) = c j − c j−1.
Second, we note that the actions (0,1) and (1,0) must be played with equal probability in equilibrium. To see this,
suppose that (1,0) is played more often than (0,1). Then, the probability that the second auction has the price of 0 is
higher. However, since the agent is indifferent between winning either item the best response is to play (0,1) more often.
Therefore, in equilibrium, the probabilities of playing (1,0) and (0,1) are the same, and these actions have an identical
utility line in the best response. As a result, the best response interval on which either of the bids is played is continuous.
That is, if these bids are played in an equilibrium on the interval [c1, c2], then there is a continuum of equivalent equilibria
where:
s(θi) = (0,1) or (1,0) | f (1,0) = f (0,1) = c2 − c12 if θi ∈ [c1, c2]. (14)
This explains the switching behaviour we observed in ﬁctitious play (see Section 6.2.3): at the equilibrium point any order of
bids (1,0) and (0,1) is acceptable. However, any small change away from h((1,0)) = h((0,1)), leads to a unique preferred
order. For notational convenience, since the probabilities of playing (1,0) and (0,1) are the same in equilibrium, in the
following we merge this action into a single action and refer to the merged action as (1,0). Speciﬁcally, saying that the
action (1,0) is played on the interval [c j−1, c j] means that the actions (1,0) and (0,1) are played with equal probabilities
on this interval.
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of h, the action (1,0) wins in all the cases when the action of (0,0) wins. Similarly, the action (1,1) wins in all the cases
when the action (1,0) wins. Thus, (0,0) has the lowest slope, (1,0) is next, and (1,1) has the highest slope. In particular,
notice that the order does not depend on γ . Now, following Observation 2, in equilibrium, the slope increases in type, which
means that (1,0) (or (0,1)) is played by higher types than (0,0), and (1,1) is played by higher types than (1,0). Note that
this is consistent with the equilibrium strategy described in Table 2.
The next step is to see which actions are played in equilibrium, and with what probabilities. It is easy to see that for any
action distribution, (0,0) is the best response for types that are low enough and, thus, is played with a positive probability
in any equilibrium. However, it is never the case that (0,0) is the only action in the support. These observations imply that
the possible sets of equilibrium actions are {(0,0) (1,0)}, {(0,0) (1,1)}, and the set of all actions {(0,0) (1,0) (1,1)}. In
fact, as we will show, each of these sets corresponds to an equilibrium for some range of complementarity structures.
As an example, consider the set A′ = {(0,0) (1,0)}. In the notation of Lemma 1, m′ = |A′| = 2 and, to establish the
probability of each action being played we are looking for the intersection point 0 c1  1 satisfying:
u
(
c1, (0,0),h(·; c)
)= u(c1, (1,0),h(·; c)),
u
(
1, (1,0),h(·; c)) u(1, (1,1),h(·; c)).
A solution exists only for 0< γ  2(2− √2) and is unique:
c1 = −4− γ +
√
16γ + γ 2
−4+ 2γ .
Carrying out a similar analysis, we derive equilibria for the other 2 action sets. Details of these derivations can be found
in Appendix D. These derivations show that there is a unique equilibrium (except for variations between actions (0,1) and
(1,0)) for each value of γ . More formally:
Theorem 5. The simultaneous auctions game deﬁned by 2 bidders, actions
A = {(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)}
uniform distribution of types in [0,1], and complementarity structure α = β = 1 and γ > 0 has a unique22 equilibrium deﬁned below
for every value of γ .
For 0< γ  2(2− √2) the equilibrium is A′ = {(0,0) (1,0)} and c = (c1) where:
c1 = −γ − 4±
√
γ 2 + 16γ
2(γ − 2) .
For 2(2− √2) < γ < 2 the equilibrium is A′ = {(0,0) (1,0) (1,1)} and c = (c1, c2) where:
c1 = 2(2− 2γ +
√−γ 2 + γ 3)
4− 4γ + γ 2 ,
c2 = −6γ
2 + 4√(−1+ γ )γ 2 + 2γ (2+√(−1+ γ )γ 2)
(−2+ γ )2(−γ +√(−1+ γ )γ 2) .
For γ = 2 the equilibrium is A′ = {(0,0) (1,1)} and c = (.5).
For 2< γ the equilibrium is A′ = {(0,0) (1,1)} and c = (c1) where:
c1 = −6− γ +
√−28+ 44γ + γ 2
4(−2+ γ ) .
Fig. 15 plots the action distributions deﬁned in the theorem above. Notice that the graph is virtually identical (up to
very ﬁne precision) to Fig. 10 obtained via numerical simulations. As we conjectured in Section 6.2.3, the equilibrium
probabilities of each action are continuous in γ . The structure identiﬁed in Table 3 is also conﬁrmed. Using the analytical
characterisation, we determined that the smallest value of γ for which the bid (1,1) is played in equilibrium is 2(2− √2).
This provides the exact value of γˆ1, which we roughly estimated to be around 1.2 by looking at Fig. 10.
Furthermore, the value of γ = 2 corresponds to independent auctions and equilibrium can be found for each auction
separately. The single auction equilibrium with possible bids 0 and 1 can be easily derived: the unique equilibrium is to bid
0 for the values below 0.5 and to bid 1 for the values above 0.5. Combining individual equilibrium strategies, we get the
22 We are treating all equilibria given by Eq. (14) as one.
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equilibrium strategy: bid (0,0) for the values below 0.5 and (1,1) for the values above. Each of the two equilibrium bids
has the probability of 0.5 as can be seen in Fig. 15 for γ = 2.
Our analytical results show that, even though the approximate equilibrium strategy is not guaranteed to be similar to
the actual Nash equilibrium strategy, in practice, we ﬁnd that the empirical results are very close to the exact ones.
8. Conclusions
In this work we generalise FP to games of incomplete information with discrete actions and continuous types. We prove
that, if FP beliefs converge, a pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium can be constructed from the beliefs’ limit point. Our
algorithm recovers this equilibrium in case of (asymptotic) convergence. Furthermore, a pure -equilibria for any  > 0 can
be obtained after a ﬁnite number of iterations.
The key distinguishing feature of our FP approach is that it works directly with continuous types and remains scalable
in the number of agents and actions. This is in contrast to other currently available solvers (e.g., those listed in Section 2)
that are typically only able to ﬁnd equilibria in settings with discrete type spaces of small size or two players. Although,
recent advances (such as graphical game representations and hybrid algorithms) allow discrete solvers to scale to larger
type spaces, they nevertheless fail to accommodate cardinally larger continuous types. On the other hand, our algorithm
is applicable to a large class of games with continuous type spaces and each iteration of FP can be computed eﬃciently.
Furthermore, our FP algorithm can be applied to a wide range of auction settings, providing equilibrium calculations that
otherwise would require specialised analyses and solution algorithms.
To illustrate the eﬃcacy of our algorithm, we perform a set of numerical experiments, where FP was applied to a range
of simultaneous auctions settings, where players have various combinatorial preferences for the items. The experiments
show that FP converges to a very small  in the settings we investigate, providing an empirical characterisation of equilibria
in a complex domain for which no general theoretical results exist. We then analyse these equilibria in detail. The results
show that, for weakly complementary items, as we vary the complementarity structure, the changes in equilibrium bids are
continuous (there are no jumps). Furthermore, we observe that the bids are monotonic within each range of the comple-
mentarity parameter, i.e. where the support of equilibrium bids does not change. These characteristics continue to hold as
we increase the number of bid levels and the number of bidders, although the position of the regions shift.
While the numerical results show convergence to -Nash equilibria with very small  (in the order of less than 1%
of the utility), there is no guarantee that this equilibrium is close to the true pure Nash equilibrium (which is known to
exist for our setting). Therefore, to further support our results, in addition to the algorithm, we developed a full analytical
characterisation for small settings. This shows that the equilibrium results are in fact unique, and correspond to those found
by the FP algorithm.
We observe numerical convergence of FP to -equilibrium in all of our experiments, and to the same strategy in the
experiments with complementary items. However, at the moment, we are not able to prove convergence analytically. The
problem also proves elusive in games of complete information where results are available only for restricted settings (see,
e.g., [7,15]). In fact, there are counter examples where FP is known not to converge. Identifying restricted settings of incom-
plete information where the generalised version of ﬁctitious play provably converges remains open for future work.
Also open for future research are applications of the technique presented here to other domains (e.g., multi-unit or
combinatorial auctions), both as a means of testing the convergence properties of FP, and as a means of obtaining numerical
solutions to initiate a study of equilibrium properties in these domains. In fact, the technique outlined in this paper has been
recently applied to compute equilibrium trading strategies in simultaneous double auctions in [54]. The authors show that
in such settings, the FP algorithm consistently converges, allowing equilibrium trading strategies to be identiﬁed. There, the
authors go even beyond a simple double auction to multiple simultaneous double auctions, where both buyers and sellers
need to choose a double auction where they place bids and asks respectively. This setting is complex due to the presence
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avoid competing buyers, and conversely for sellers.
Appendix A. Extensions
In this appendix we review some of the assumptions we used in the main body of the paper regarding the setting, utility
functions and equilibria. Speciﬁcally, we consider, in turn, the limitations of a symmetric setting, single-dimensional type
and linear dependency of the utility in type. In more detail, we show how the algorithm can be used to handle asymmetric
settings and give a sketch of extensions to our algorithms to resolve the remaining limitations.
A.1. Asymmetric ﬁctitious play
It is straightforward to extend the algorithms presented in this paper to asymmetric settings where each player has a
potentially different action space, A, utility function, u(·), type space Θ , and distribution over types F (·), resulting in asym-
metric equilibria. Formally, an asymmetric Bayesian game is deﬁned by Γasym = 〈N, {Ai,ui(·),Θi, Fi(·)}i∈N 〉.23 In equilibrium,
each player i ∈ N can have a different strategy si(·), resulting in action distribution hs,i(·). Moreover, the expected utility
function of a player i of type θ ∈ Θi when playing action ai in an asymmetric setting given the action distributions of other
players j ∈ N−i = N\i is deﬁned as:
uˆi
(
θ,ai, {hs, j} j∈N−i
)= E{Y j∼hs, j} j∈N−i [ui(θ,ai, {Y j} j∈N−i )].
Similarly, the expected utility from playing a strategy s′(·) when players j = i play strategies s j(·) is u˜i(s′, {hs, j} j∈N−i ) =
Eθ∼Xi [uˆi(θ, si(θ), {hs, j} j∈N−i )].
Given this we can deﬁne an asymmetric equilibrium as follows:
Deﬁnition 4. A strategy proﬁle si : Θi → Ai , i ∈ N is an asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of a game Γasym if:
u˜i
(
si, {hs, j} j∈N−i
)
 u˜i
(
s′, {hs, j} j∈N−i
) ∀s′ ∈ Si, i ∈ N.
The remaining deﬁnitions can be modiﬁed analogously to the asymmetric setting.
We now turn to the FP algorithm in Fig. 1. To handle asymmetric settings, the algorithm now needs to compute the
best response and maintain a separate set of beliefs for each player i ∈ N , which need to be updated separately (note that,
if a subset of the players are symmetric, these can be grouped together into a single representative player). There are two
approaches in which the beliefs can be updated: simultaneously or sequentially. In the former case, the best response for
each player is calculated based on the beliefs from the previous iteration (at time t). In the latter case, the FP beliefs of
each player are updated sequentially and these updated beliefs are used by the next player to calculate his best response.
Although simultaneous updating is most commonly used in standard FP, Berger has shown that sequential updating actually
has better convergence properties [62].
The amended FP algorithm containing both alternative updating rules is given in Fig. 16. Note that the BestResponse
procedure requires a minor modiﬁcation to the input to include the index of the player whose strategy we are computing,
and the action distribution for each player j = i. However, no other modiﬁcations are needed to this algorithm. Furthermore,
note that the BeliefsToStrategy procedure needs to be executed for each player. Finally, the convergence criterion
needs to be modiﬁed since the best response can produce a different  for each player.
A.2. Multi-dimensional types and non-linear utility
First, taking a closer look at the FictitiousPlay algorithm, depicted in Fig. 1, it is easy to see that it does not directly
depend on the type space dimensionality. Rather, it was in the best response calculation and the BeliefsToStrategy
procedure, where we made explicit use of our assumptions. Therefore, it is for these procedures that we need to relax our
assumptions of type-space dimensionality and utility linearity.
Second, both the calculation of the best response and the BeliefsToStrategy procedure are based on a particular
division of the type space: speciﬁcally, type space breakdown to action-equivalent subsets with respect to the best response
upper envelope. Formally, for a belief h, we deﬁne for every action a ∈ A a set N˜a(h) = {θ ∈ Θ | uˆ(θ,a,h) uˆ(θ,a′,h) ∀a′ ∈
A}. Given a particular lexicographic ordering  of actions, we can reﬁne these sets into a collection of disjoint sets {Ia}a∈ A˜⊆A
(e.g., by setting Ia = N˜a \⋃a′a N˜a′ , and purging empty Ia ’s). Notice, that the collection {Ia}a∈ A˜ is a cover of the type space,
so that
⋃
a∈ A˜ Ia = Θ . In fact, a speciﬁc collection would fully characterise the best response to a belief h. In particular, in
23 Importantly, even though each agent has a different type distribution, Fi(·), we still require that these distributions are common knowledge. That is, we
do not consider settings where some players have asymmetric beliefs about another player, and extending the FP algorithm to such settings is non-trivial.
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Input: game Γasym = 〈N, {Ai ,ui(·),Θi , Fi(·)}i∈N 〉,
initial beliefs h0i , i ∈ N , update rule κ
Output: if converges, equilibrium strategy
1: set iteration count t = 0
2: repeat
3: for i ∈ N
4a: using simultaneous updating:
strategy s = BestResponse(Γasym, i, {htj} j∈N−i )
4b: using sequential updating:
strategy s = BestResponse(Γasym, i, {ht+1j } j<i , {htj} j>i)
5: compute the corresponding action distribution:
∀ai ∈ Ai : hs(ai) =
∫
s−1(ai ) f i(x)dx
6: update beliefs of player i:
∀ai ∈ Ai : ht+1i (ai) = κ(t)hti (ai)+ (1− κ(t))hs(ai)
7: end for
8: set t = t + 1
9: until converged
10: return {BeliefsToStrategy(ht+1i )}i∈N
Fig. 16. Fictitious play algorithm for asymmetric games of incomplete information.
the case of single-dimensional utilities, this led to an interval structure. Notice, that BeliefsToStrategy simply utilises
the collection {Ia}a∈ A˜ to deﬁne a policy s(θ) = argmaxa∈ A˜ 1Ia (θ).
Furthermore, formally the construction of the collection {Ia} needs no assumption on the dimensionality, nor linearity
of the utility function. Rather, these properties effect only the eﬃciency of that collection’s representation. For instance, in
the case of single-dimensional type space, the ordering of actions (by slope of their utility) created a linear fully ordered
structure — the interval structure. On the other hand, for a two-dimensional type space, such an ordering is infeasible.
However, alternative representations of such collections are possible. In fact, the ﬁeld of computational geometry provides
an extensive arsenal of such representations and algorithms ranging from envelopes of piecewise linear functions (see,
e.g., [63]) to complex analytical curves (see, e.g., [64]).
Finally, notice that only the proof of Theorem 3 has made any use of the interval structure. Speciﬁcally, it relied on
the fact that the geometry of the interval structure is similar for similar beliefs ht and h∗ . This statement, however, can be
reproduced for any representation of the collection {Ia}, be that a set of intervals or a Delaunay triangulation, as long as it
is consistent with some partial transitive ordering of actions for all beliefs h. Hence, by augmenting the representation of
{Ia}, both the BeliefsToStrategy procedure and Theorem 3 can be adapted to hold for any dimensionality of the type
space (or a non-linear utility).
Appendix B. Expected utility with fair tie-breaking
In this section we provide a computationally eﬃcient procedure to compute the expected utility of an agent when there
are m = 2 simultaneous auctions, when using a fair tie breaking rule. This tie breaking rule means that, if k players place
the same bid in a particular auction, the probability of winning that auction is given by 1/k. For convenience, we assume
that both auctions have the same bid levels. Let B denote the set of discrete bids in a particular auction. Then the set of
actions A = B × B available to each bidder is given by bid pairs b = (b1,b2) ∈ A, where b1 and b2 are the bids in auctions
1 and 2 respectively.
Recall from Section 6.1 that the expected utility from playing an action b ∈ A is given by:
uˆ(θ,b,h) = θ
∑
η⊆K
φ(η)q(b, η,h)− cost(b,h). (B.1)
In the following, we consider the left term ﬁrst (which computes the expected value), followed by the right term (which
computes the expected cost). Let Pr(Wi), Pr(Wi ∩ W j), and Pr(Wi ∩ W¯ j) denote the probability of winning auction i, the
probability of winning both auctions i and j, and the probability of winning auction i but not j. Then for K = {1,2}, we can
rewrite the ﬁrst term (ignoring the type) in Eq. (B.1) as follows:∑
η⊆{1,2}
φ(η)q(b, η,h) = αq(b, {1},h)+ βq(b, {2},h)+ γ q(b, {1,2},h)
= α Pr(W1 ∩ W¯2)+ β Pr(W¯1 ∩ W2)+ γ Pr(W1 ∩ W2)
= α[Pr(W1)− Pr(W1 ∩ W2)]+ β[Pr(W2)− Pr(W1 ∩ W2)]+ γ Pr(W1 ∩ W2)
= α Pr(W1)+ β Pr(W2)+ [γ − α − β]Pr(W1 ∩ W2),
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to calculate the expected value, it is suﬃcient to calculate Pr(W1), Pr(W2), and Pr(W1 ∩ W2). In the following, we derive
these probabilities based on the action distribution h.
Let H(b) = ∑b′∈A: b′1<b1&b′2<b2 h(b′). It is convenient to think of the function H as a (multi-dimensional) cumulative
distribution, where h is the corresponding probability mass function. In the following, we will also use the notation
H(b1,b2) = H(b) and h(b1,b2) = h(b). Note that we deﬁne the inequalities in H to be strict. In addition, we use  bi
to denote a non-strict relationship for a particular auction. For example, H(b1, b2) =∑b′∈A: b′1<b1&b′2b2 h(b′).24 Further-
more, let X1 and X2 denote random variables representing the bids placed by a bidder in auctions 1 and 2 respectively.25
We can then use the functions H and h to deﬁne the following events:
1. Pr(X1 < b1 ∩ X2 < b2) = H(b1,b2): win both auctions,
2. Pr(X1 = b1 ∩ X2 = b2) = h(b1,b2): tie in both auctions,
3. Pr(X1 = b1 ∩ X2 < b2) = H( b1,b2)− H(b1,b2): tie in auction 1 and win auction 2,
4. Pr(X1 < b1 ∩ X2 = b2) = H(b1, b2)− H(b1,b2): win auction 1 and tie in auction 2,
5. Pr(X1 > b1 ∩ X2 > b2) = [1− H( b1, b2)]: lose both auctions.
Note that the above events are mutually exclusive and always sum to one. If we deﬁne Hi(bi) = ∑b′∈A: b′i<bi h(b′) to
be the cumulative bid distribution for a particular auction, we can similarly derive mutually exclusive events for a single
auction:
1. Pr(Xi < bi) = Hi(bi): win auction i,
2. Pr(Xi = bi) = Hi( bi)− Hi(bi): tie in auction i,
3. Pr(Xi > bi) = [1− Hi( bi)]: lose auction i.
The above provides the probabilities of certain events for a single other opponent. However, since there are n − 1 oppo-
nents, we need to calculate the distribution of the ﬁrst-order statistic. When the bids are continuous, this is straightforward
since (for example) Pr(Xi < bi) = Pr(Xi  bi), and so Pr(Wi) = Pr(Xi < bi)n−1 = Hi(bi)n−1. However, in the case of discrete
bids, we also have to account for the tie breaking rule. For the single-auction case, Pr(Wi) becomes26:
Pr(Wi) =
n−1∑
x=0
1
x+ 1
(
n− 1
x
)
Pr(Xi = bi)x Pr(Xi < bi)n−1−x. (B.2)
In the case of two auctions, this becomes much more complex since we need to enumerate over three possible events where
ties occur: ties can occur in auction 1 only, in auction 2 only, or in both auctions. In the following, let x denote the number
of bidders that correspond to ﬁrst event, y to the second event, and z to the third event. Then, Pr(W1 ∩ W2) becomes:
Pr(W1 ∩ W2)
=
n−1∑
x=0
n−1−x∑
y=0
n−1−x−y∑
z=0
(
n− 1
x
)(
n− 1− x
y
)(
n − 1− x− y
z
)
1
x+ z + 1
1
y + z + 1
× Pr(X1 = b1 ∩ X2 < b2)x Pr(X1 < b1 ∩ X2 = b2)y Pr(X1 = b1 ∩ X2 = b2)z
× Pr(X1 < b1 ∩ X2 < b2)n−1−x−y−z. (B.3)
The above completes the computation of the expected value. We now show how to compute the ﬁnal component of Eq. (B.1),
the expected cost cost(b,h). We note that, unlike the probability of winning η out of K auctions, we can consider the ex-
pected costs for each auction separately thanks to linearity of expectation. Speciﬁcally, cost(b,h) = cost1(b1,h)+ cost2(b2,h),
where costi(bi,h) is the expected cost of auction i when bidding bi in this auction. From [1] we know that for a single
second-price auction, in the continuous case, the expected payment is equal to: costi(bi,h) =
∫ bi
0 yg(y)dy, where g(y) is
the density function of the ﬁrst-order statistic of the bid distribution. However, with discrete bids, we need to consider two
cases separately: when the second-highest bid in auction i is strictly less than bi , then the bidder wins for sure. On the
other hand, if the second-highest bid is equal to bi , the probability of winning depends on the tie breaking rule. This results
in the following equation:
24 In practice, these functions can be implemented using a single look-up table, which can be computed in linear time and needs to be generated only
once at the beginning of each FP iteration.
25 Note that these random variables consider the bids of one of the bidders, and not all bidders. Since bidders are assumed to be symmetric it does not
matter which particular one. Also, note that the variables are interdependent since the actions specify bid pairs. Therefore, we cannot assume that, e.g.,
Pr(X1 < b1 ∩ X2 < b2) = Pr(X1 < b1) · Pr(X2 < b2).
26 Note that this is similar to Example 1 in Section 3, except that the distribution also takes into account the fact that the actions are joint bids over
multiple auctions.
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∑
x∈B|x<bi
x
[(
Hi( x)
)n−1 − (Hi(x))n−1]+ bi[Pr(Wi)− (Hi(x))n−1], (B.4)
where [(Hi( x))n−1 − (Hi(x))n−1] is the marginal bid distribution and corresponds to g(y) in the continuous case. This
completes the expected utility calculation.
As can be seen, due to the tie breaking rule, calculating the expected utility is computationally demanding. In particular,
Eq. (B.3) considers all combination of ties which can simultaneously occur in 2 auctions (note that we cannot consider
the auctions independently as the bid probabilities in the two auctions are correlated), and its computation is in the order
of O (n3). This complexity increases rapidly for more than 2 auctions. Hence, in the next section we consider a way to
approximate the expected utility concerning the tie breaking.
B.1. Approximate tie breaking
The above shows that, while computing the expected cost component of the expected utility is relatively easy since
this can be done independently for each auction, the same is not true for calculating the expected value, which involves
calculating the probability of winning every subset of auctions. In particular, the tie breaking rule increases the computation
required and does not scale well with the number of bidders and the number of auctions. To address this problem, in
this section we present an approximated tie breaking rule, which has been used in some of the experiments in this paper
(speciﬁcally, in Section 6.2.2).
In more detail, the approximation is based on the observation that, in the case of 2 auctions, the exact probability of
winning is always between H( b1, b2)n−1 and H(b1,b2)n−1. The ﬁrst term over-estimates the probability of winning,
whereas the second term underestimates it. Given this, the approximate probability of winning both auction is deﬁned as:
P˜r(W1 ∩ W2) = λH( b1, b2)n−1 + (1− λ)H(b1,b2)n−1, (B.5)
where λ is a parameter which can be tuned. In the experiments, we used the value λ = 1/3 which performed well in
general compared to the exact solution, although we did not excessively tune it. Note that this approach can also be applied
to a single auction, and more than 2 auctions.
B.2. Two bidders
Here, we consider a special case of the equations with the exact tie breaking rule for n = 2. Instantiating Eq. (B.3) for
n = 2, this results in the following 4 combinations of (x, y, z): (0,0,0); (0,0,1); (0,1,0);(1,0,0). Expanding the equation
we get
Pr(W1 ∩ W2) = H(b1,b2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0,0,0
+ 1
4
h(b1,b2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0,0,1
+ 1
2
[
H(b1,b2 + )− H(b1,b2)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0,1,0
+ 1
2
[
H(b1 + ,b2)− H(b1,b2)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1,0,0
= 1
4
h(b1,b2)+ 1
2
H(b1, b2)+ 1
2
H( b1,b2).
In the case of a single auction, we get:
Pr(Wi) = Hi(bi)+ 12
[
Hi( bi)− Hi(bi)
]= 1
2
[
Hi( bi)+ Hi(bi)
]
. (B.6)
Instantiating Eq. (B.1), we get
u(θ,b,h) = θ(α Pr(W1)+ β Pr(W2)+ (γ − α − β)Pr(W1 ∩ W2))− cost(b,h)
= θ
(
α
1
2
[
H1( b1)+ H1(b1)
]+ β 1
2
[
H2( b2)+ H2(b2)
]
+ (γ − α − β)
[
1
4
h(b1,b2)+ 1
2
H(b1, b2)+ 1
2
H( b1,b2)
])
− cost(b,h).
The expected payment for auction i simpliﬁes to
costi(bi,h) =
( ∑
x∈B|x<bi
x
[
Hi( x)− Hi(x)
])+ 1
2
bi
[
Hi( bi)− Hi(bi)
]
.
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Further assume the only available bids levels are B = {0,1}. This results in 4 possible bid pairs as actions. We denote the
probability of encountering each bid pair, and the corresponding cumulative distribution as follows:
h(0,0) = x, H(0,0) = 0,
h(1,0) = y, H(1,0) = 0, H( 1,1) = x+ y,
h(0,1) = z, H(0,1) = 0, H(1, 1) = x+ z,
h(1,1) = 1− x− y − z, H(1,1) = x H( 1, 1) = 1.
The corresponding distributions for single auctions are:
H1(0) = 0, H1(1) = x+ z, H1( 1) = 1,
H2(0) = 0, H2(1) = x+ y, H2( 1) = 1.
This then results in the following expected utility for each action:
uˆ
(
θ, (0,0),h
)= θ
[
α
(
1
4
x+ 1
2
z
)
+ β
(
1
4
x+ 1
2
y
)
+ γ 1
4
x
]
,
uˆ
(
θ, (1,0),h
)= θ
[
α
(
−1
4
y + 1
2
z + 1
2
)
+ β 1
4
y + γ
(
1
4
y + 1
2
x
)]
− 1
2
(1− x− z),
uˆ
(
θ, (0,1),h
)= θ
[
α
1
4
z + β
(
1
2
y − 1
4
z + 1
2
)
+ γ
(
1
4
z + 1
2
x
)]
− 1
2
(1− x− y),
uˆ
(
θ, (1,1),h
)= θ
[
α
(
−1
4
x− 1
4
y + 1
4
z + 1
4
)
+ β
(
−1
4
x+ 1
4
y − 1
4
z + 1
4
)
+ γ
(
3
4
x+ 1
4
y + 1
4
z + 1
4
)]
− 1+ x+ 1
2
(y + z).
B.4. Identical auctions
The auctions are identical when α = β . Since we do not restrict γ , we can without loss of generality set α = β = 1.
uˆ
(
θ, (0,0),h
)= θ
[
1
2
x+ 1
2
y + 1
2
z + γ 1
4
x
]
,
uˆ
(
θ, (1,0),h
)= θ
[
1
2
z + 1
2
+ γ
(
1
4
y + 1
2
x
)]
− 1
2
(1− x− z),
uˆ
(
θ, (0,1),h
)= θ
[
1
2
y + 1
2
+ γ
(
1
4
z + 1
2
x
)]
− 1
2
(1− x− y),
uˆ
(
θ, (1,1),h
)= θ
[(
−1
2
x+ 1
2
)
+ γ
(
3
4
x+ 1
4
y + 1
4
z + 1
4
)]
− 1+ x+ 1
2
(y + z).
We are interested in utilities under symmetric equilibria. In all such equilibria the probabilities of playing bids (1,0) and
(0,1) are the same: i.e., y = z.
uˆ
(
θ, (0,0),h
)= θ
[
1
2
x+ y + γ 1
4
x
]
,
uˆ
(
θ, (1,0),h
)= u(θ, (0,1))= θ
[
1
2
y + 1
2
+ γ
(
1
4
y + 1
2
x
)]
− 1
2
(1− x− y),
uˆ
(
θ, (1,1),h
)= θ
[(
−1
2
x+ 1
2
)
+ γ
(
3
4
x+ 1
2
y + 1
4
)]
− 1+ x+ y.
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We need to show that (A′, c) speciﬁes an upper envelope of the utility lines {uˆ(θ,a j,h)}mj=1. Eqs. (7) and (8) simply
limit attention to a convenient best-response representation, which, as we noted is without loss of generality. A pair (A′, c)
satisfying these two equations deﬁnes a function:
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First we show the “if" direction. Eq. (9) guarantees that the function is continuous: at each intersection point c j (where the
function g(θ) switches from one utility line to another), the values of adjacent utility lines are the same. This function is an
upper envelope if no utility line lies above it. Since each equation is a line, it is suﬃcient to check that at each intersection
point c j the value of g(θ) is at least as high as the value of all other utility lines. In fact, it is enough to check each of
the lines A \ A′ at exactly one c j as we argue next. For a line ak ∈ A \ A′ we can uniquely identify a′j and a′j+1 such that
a′j ≺ ak ≺ a′j+1. Eq. (11)27 checks that the utility from playing ak at the type c j is below the utility from playing a′j (which,
by Eq. (9), is the same as the utility from playing a′j+1). Formally, we have:
uˆ(c j,ak,h) uˆ
(
c j,a
′
j,h
)= uˆ(c j,a′j+1,h).
We ﬁrst consider:
uˆ(c j,ak,h) uˆ
(
c j,a
′
j+1,h
)
. (C.1)
Since two lines intersect at most once, and after the intersection, the line with the higher slope is on top, Eqs. (9) together
with a′1 ≺ · · · ≺ a′m′ imply:
uˆ
(
c j+1,a′j+1,h
)
 uˆ
(
c j+1,a′j+2,h
) ∀θ  c j+1,
uˆ
(
c j+2,a′j+2,h
)
 uˆ
(
c j+2,a′j+3,h
) ∀θ  c j+2,
. . .
uˆ
(
cm′−1,a′m′−1,h
)
 uˆ
(
cm′−1,a′m′ ,h
) ∀θ  cm′−1.
Recalling that ak ≺ a′j+1 and applying the argument above to Eq. (C.1), we get:
uˆ(θ,ak,h) uˆ
(
θ,a′j+1,h
) ∀θ  c j . (C.2)
Noting that uˆ(c j,a′j+1,h) uˆ(c j+1,a′j+1,h) and combining Eq. (C.2) with the inequalities above, we get:
uˆ(ci,ak,h) uˆ
(
ci,a
′
i,h
) ∀i  j + 1. (C.3)
In other words, if a utility line with a smaller slope than a′j+1 is below a
′
j+1 at c j , then it is also below g(θ) for all types
above c j . It remains to consider the case of a′j ≺ ak:
uˆ(c j,ak,h) uˆ
(
c j,a
′
j,h
)
. (C.4)
Analogously to the argument above, before two lines intersect, the one with the lower slope is above the one with the
higher slope. Hence, Eq. (9) and a′1 ≺ · · · ≺ a′m′ imply:
uˆ
(
c j−1,a′j,h
)
 uˆ
(
c j−1,a′j−1,h
) ∀θ  c j−1,
uˆ
(
c j−2,a′j−1,h
)
 uˆ
(
c j−2,a′j−2,h
) ∀θ  c j−2,
. . .
uˆ
(
c1,a
′
2,h
)
 uˆ
(
c1,a
′
1,h
) ∀θ  c1.
Recalling that ak ≺ a′j+1, and applying the argument above to Eq. (C.4), we get:
uˆ(θ,ak,h) uˆ
(
θ,a′j,h
) ∀θ  c j. (C.5)
Noting that uˆ(c j−1,ak,h) uˆ(c j−1,a′j,h) and combining Eq. (C.5) with the inequalities above, we get:
uˆ(ci,ak,h) uˆ
(
ci,a
′
i,h
) ∀i  j. (C.6)
By Eqs. (C.3) and (C.6), the line for ak is below g(θ) at all intersection points ci and therefore at all types. This argument
applies to all lines ak , proving that (A′, c) is a best response.
The “only if” part of the proof is trivial: violating Eq. (9) for any j results in a discontinuous function, while a best
response must be continuous. Furthermore, if any of the inequalities in Eqs. (10) or (11) do not hold, then a better response
is available, again contradicting the best response. 
27 Eq. (10) covers the special case of a′1, the ﬁrst action in A′: the value of g(θ) at 0 is checked to be at least as high as the values of all utility lines with
slopes below a′1.
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Here we provide a derivation of the equilibria discussed in Section 6 and plotted in Fig. 15. The equilibrium bid distri-
bution for a symmetric equilibrium (A′, c) is
h(bπ( j); c) = F (c j)− F (c j−1) ∀1 j 
∣∣A′∣∣,
h(b j; c) = 0 ∀b j /∈ A′.
Plugging in the uniform distribution of types we get
h(bπ( j); c) = c j − c j−1 ∀1 j 
∣∣A′∣∣.
As before, we use x, y, y,1− x− 2y to denote h(0,0), h(1,0), h(0,1), and h(1,1) respectively.
We present a complete derivation for A′ = {(0,0) (1,0)}. The piecewise linear strategy (A′, c) consists of 2 intervals:
bid (0,0) is played on the interval θ ∈ [0, c1], bid (1,0) on the interval θ ∈ [c1,1]. The strategy is given by a parameter
0< c1 < 1. Using Lemma 1, (A′, c) must satisfy
u
(
c1, (0,0),h(·; c)
)= u(c1, (1,0),h(·; c)), (D.1)
u
(
1, (1,0),h(·; c)) u(1, (1,1),h(·; c)), (D.2)
h(0,0) = x = c1, h(1,0) = h(0,1) = y = 1− c1
2
, h(1,1) = 0. (D.3)
Since we ﬁxed A′ , the only degrees of freedom are c and γ . We solve the ﬁrst equation for c1 as a function of γ and plug
it into the second inequality to ﬁnd the range of γ supporting the equilibrium (A′, c).
Expanding u(c1, (0,0),h(·; c)) = u(c1, (1,0),h(·; c)), we obtain
c1
[
1
2
x+ y + γ 1
4
x
]
= c1
[
1
2
y + 1
2
+ γ
(
1
4
y + 1
2
x
)]
− 1
2
(1− x− y).
Replacing x and y according to Eqs. (D.3) and simplifying we obtain
c21(γ − 2)+ c1(γ + 4)− 2= 0.
The roots of the quadratic equation are
c1 = −γ − 4±
√
γ 2 + 16γ
2(γ − 2) .
The roots are real only for γ −16 and γ  0∧ γ = 2. We are only interested in the roots that satisfy 0< c1 < 1. The root
−γ − 4−√16γ + γ 2
2(γ − 2)
is never between 0 and 1: negative for γ = −16 and decreasing as γ decreases; equal to 1 for γ = 0 and increasing for
γ ∈ [0,2); approaching −1 from below for γ > 2. The other root
c1 = −γ − 4+
√
16γ + γ 2
2(γ − 2) (D.4)
is approaching zero from below for γ  −16 as γ decreases. This root falls into the feasible range 0 < c1 < 1 for γ > 0
(undeﬁned for γ = 2): equals 1 at γ = 0 and approaches zero from above as γ increases. Therefore, only Eq. (D.4) for γ > 0
may be supporting an equilibrium. To be an equilibrium, it must satisfy Eq. (D.2). We ﬁnd the values of γ > 0 where the
condition is satisﬁed[
1
2
y + 1
2
+ γ
(
1
4
y + 1
2
x
)]
− 1
2
(1− x− y)
[(
−1
2
x+ 1
2
)
+ γ
(
3
4
x+ 1
2
y + 1
4
)]
− 1+ x+ y.
Replacing x and y according to Eqs. (D.3), then replacing c1 with Eq. (D.4), we get after simpliﬁcation
5γ 2 + γ√16γ + γ 2 − 24γ + 16
16(2− γ )  0.
Solving the resulting inequality for γ , we obtain 0 < γ  2(2 − √2) giving us a full characterisation of equilibrium for
A′ = {(0,0) (1,0)}: the strategy (A′, c) with c deﬁned in Eq. (D.4) is an equilibrium for 0 < γ  2(2 − √2). There are no
other equilibria with the support A′ = {(0,0) (1,0)}.
138 Z. Rabinovich et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 195 (2013) 106–139Equilibria for A′ = A = {(0,0) (1,0) (1,1)} and A′ = {(0,0) (1,1)} are derived similarly.28 The systems of equations that
need to be solved are
u
(
c1, (0,0),h(·; c)
)= u(c1, (1,0),h(·; c)),
u
(
c2, (1,0),h(·; c)
)= u(c2, (1,1),h(·; c)),
0< c1 < c2 < 1,
h(0,0) = c1, h(1,0) = h(0,1) = c2 − c1
2
, h(1,1) = 1− c1 − c2 − c1
2
and
u
(
c1, (0,0),h(·; c)
)= u(c1, (1,1),h(·; c)),
u
(
c1, (0,0),h(·; c)
)
 u
(
c1, (1,0),h(·; c)
)
,
0< c1 < 1,
h(0,0) = c1, h(1,0) = h(0,1) = 0, h(1,1) = 1− c1
respectively.
The results above show that the equilibrium for each value of γ is unique (see Fig. 15).
We omit algebraic derivations and only present the solutions describing equilibria. The bids A′ = A = {(0,0) (1,0) (1,1)}
support the following unique equilibrium on 2(2− √2) < γ < 2
c1 = 2(2− 2γ +
√−γ 2 + γ 3)
4− 4γ + γ 2 ,
c2 = −6γ
2 + 4√(−1+ γ )γ 2 + 2γ (2+√(−1+ γ )γ 2)
(−2+ γ )2(−γ +√(−1+ γ )γ 2) .
The bids A′ = {(0,0) (1,1)} support the following unique equilibrium on 2< γ
c1 = −6− γ +
√−28+ 44γ + γ 2
4(−2+ γ ) .
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